- HOME
- OPINION
The 'goalpost rate' mystery: How a government policy invited collusion — and who really pays
In 1976, American social psychologist Donald T. Campbell made an unsettling discovery about government policy evaluation. His inquiry began with a deceptively simple question. "If you measure performance with a number and reward people based on that number, how will they behave?" The answer was telling. At first, people worked to improve actual performance. Over time, they shifted focus from the underlying goal to gaming the metric itself. Eventually, some took actions that directly undermined the original purpose — all in the name of making the number look better. Campbell concluded that the more a quantitative indicator is used in social decision-making, the more it comes under pressure to be corrupted and the more likely it is to distort the very social process it was meant to measure. This is known as Campbell's Law. A year earlier, in 1975, British economist Charles Goodhart reached a similar conclusion. When a central bank adopts a measure such as the money supply as a policy target, financial institutions change their behavior in ways that break down the existing relationship between that indicator and the broader economy. Goodhart's Law is commonly summarized as follows. "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." How the 'goalpost rate' was born — and why it rewarded collusion over competition On June 11, 2009, the Ministry of Economy and Finance unveiled a plan to encourage financial firms to participate more actively in government bond auctions. The official then in charge of the government bond desk was Kim Jung-kwan, now the minister of trade, industry and resources. The bid-to-cover ratio for government bonds had fallen from 246 percent in 2002 to just 126 percent in the first four months of 2009. A low bid-to-cover ratio risks pushing up issuance rates and increasing the government's interest burden. The solution was what became known as the "goalpost rate" system. Under the scheme, primary dealers that failed to win bonds at auction could still have their bids counted toward their performance record, provided they had submitted bids within 3 basis points — 0.03 percentage points — above the highest accepted rate. Like kicking a ball through the goalposts without scoring a direct hit, firms could earn credit for bids that fell just outside the winning range. For example, if the highest accepted rate on a bond auction was 3.50 percent per annum, a financial firm that bid above 3.50 percent but no higher than 3.53 percent would receive partial performance credit even without winning any bonds. Primary dealers accumulate performance scores based on their underwriting records, and higher ratings unlock greater benefits. The most valuable of these is the non-competitive purchase option, which allows a dealer to buy additional bonds at the highest accepted auction rate for up to three business days after the auction closes — within limits set by the volume actually underwritten and the dealer's rating. If bond prices rise in the interim, the option creates an opportunity for profit. A goalpost-range bid alone does not automatically generate a non-competitive purchase option; actual winning bids are also required. But having unsuccessful bids counted toward the performance record can help a dealer achieve a more favorable rating and unlock greater incentives. In effect, bonds a firm never actually bought could translate into future economic benefits. The key, then, was finding the goalpost — identifying where the final accepted rate would land. Knowing what rates rivals planned to submit was a clear advantage. The structure created conditions in which securing the non-competitive purchase option could become a more important objective than winning bonds outright. Lucrative non-competitive options expanded further during COVID-19 The government's design appeared to work — at least on paper. The bid-to-cover ratio surged. From September 2009 through March 2010, the average ratio for five-year government bonds reached 223 percent, nearly double the 118 percent recorded in the same period a year earlier. Even then, some observers raised concerns that bids submitted purely to earn performance credit were artificially inflating the ratio. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the government expanded the non-competitive purchase option limits from April 2020 to facilitate bond issuance. It extended the expansion temporarily in 2022 and kept the enlarged limits in place through the end of 2023. With the incentive structure around the goalpost rate and non-competitive options already in place, the value of those options grew even larger. On Wednesday, the Fair Trade Commission announced it would impose a combined fine of 1.63 trillion won ($1.22 billion) on 15 banks and securities firms for colluding in government bond auctions — the largest penalty ever levied in a single case by the commission. The commission found that in 150 of the 345 government bond auctions held between January 2020 and June 2023, competing firms had exchanged rate information or reached agreements. In 145 of those cases, it said, there was evidence of specific agreements on bid rates or volumes. Employees at financial firms exchanged rates by phone and messenger as late as one to two minutes before auction deadlines. In some instances, a rate was agreed upon in as little as five seconds. Firms even passed on contact information for rivals and instructions on how to exchange information when staff changed roles. Estimating a competitor's likely rate is one thing; agreeing to coordinate rates is another entirely. If financial firms exploited a structural loophole for their own economic gain and went further by colluding, they cannot escape accountability. At the same time, the government that created the distorted goalpost rate system — and with it the incentive to collude — does not appear entirely free of responsibility either. A record fine that raises more questions than it answers — and a windfall for law firms The Fair Trade Commission does not emerge from this episode looking entirely beyond reproach, even after handing down the largest fine in its history. The commission emphasized "artificial increases in accepted bond rates" and "losses to public finances," yet offered little detailed explanation of the extent of the harm or the specific basis for calculating the fine. That leaves the appropriateness of the 1.63 trillion won penalty open to question. The commission calculated the relevant sales figure at around 54 trillion won, using the total value of government bond contracts awarded. It then applied a base rate of 4.5 percent and reduced the result by 30 percent to account for the special characteristics of the bond market and the uncertainty surrounding illicit gains. Financial firms argue that treating the full value of bonds underwritten as equivalent to revenue or profit is unjustified. Underwriting 1 trillion won in bonds does not mean earning 1 trillion won. Actual profit depends on the price at which bonds are sold, funding costs, the holding period, hedging transactions and other factors. The economic benefit derived specifically from the goalpost rate mechanism also warrants separate calculation, they say. In a 2012 case involving collusion in small-denomination bonds, the commission used operating profit from bond trading margins as the basis for its fine. In a case decided in January this year involving loan-to-value ratio collusion among four major banks, it used related interest income. This case is different in that a special provision for calculating contract values in bid-rigging cases was applied. Even so, the commission owes a clear explanation of why using the full value of bonds underwritten as the calculation base is appropriate here. The commission said it conducted a quantitative analysis of public finance losses attributable to the collusion during the review process, and that investigators had produced estimates of the rate impact. The full commission ultimately concluded, however, that those figures could not be determined with sufficient precision. Imposing a fine does not require pinning down the exact profit from collusion or the precise loss to public finances — deterrence is as much a purpose of penalties as recovering illicit gains. Even so, a fine of record-breaking scale demands a credible explanation of what facts underpinned the calculation and how uncertainty was factored in. Courts have previously ruled in bid-rigging cases that while using contract value as the basis for a fine is permissible, a final penalty disproportionate to the severity of the violation may run afoul of the principle of proportionality. The sanctioned firms are expected to pursue litigation. Major law firms will be involved, and former Fair Trade Commission officials now in private practice stand to benefit substantially. If success fees are tied to the size of any reduction in the fine, the initial penalty figure directly affects what law firms stand to earn. The less transparent the fine calculation and the scarcer the information, the more firms may feel compelled to spend on legal challenges. One has to wonder: if the revolving door between the commission and private law firms did not exist, why would so many former commission officials head there? Meritz Securities — which hired a former bond chief — escapes criminal referral The criteria the commission used to decide which firms to refer for criminal prosecution also warrant a clearer explanation. Meritz Securities was fined 64.56 billion won in the case but was not among the firms referred to the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency. Korea Development Bank and Korea Investment Securities, which received smaller fines, were referred. Samsung Securities and Shinhan Securities are understood to have received leniency reductions for self-reporting, and Daishin Securities for cooperating with the investigation, though the commission has not officially confirmed the leniency status or reduction levels for individual firms. The reason Meritz Securities was not referred for prosecution has not been explained. The commission said only that it weighed the degree of involvement, the duration of participation and cooperation with the investigation. The size of a fine and a decision to refer for criminal prosecution need not be strictly proportional. But if that is the case, the commission should explain what distinguished Meritz Securities from the firms that were referred. The question sharpens given that in August this year, Meritz Financial Group hired Kwak Sang-hyun, a former head of the government bond division at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as a managing director. Kwak took charge of the bond division after the collusion covered by the commission's findings had already begun, and oversaw government bond policy during the period when the commission's investigation was under way. There is no evidence of any connection between that hire and the decision to exclude Meritz Securities from criminal referral. But when the fairness of a sanction is open to question, the commission would do more to dispel suspicion by explaining its reasoning in detail than by staying silent. The K-Bond messenger is not the problem — the conduct is Some have tried to shift blame for the episode onto the over-the-counter bond market's reliance on messenger platforms. K-Bond, the messaging platform used in over-the-counter bond trading, was built and is operated by the Korea Financial Investment Association, a self-regulatory body. Conversations on the platform are logged. Overseas markets similarly rely on phone calls and platforms such as Bloomberg and Reuters for trading communication. The Korea Financial Investment Association launched a predecessor platform called Prebond in 2010, shortly after the goalpost rate system was introduced, and rebuilt it as K-Bond in 2017. The association's messenger is not a simple chat application — it is market infrastructure designed to provide real-time bid and transaction data and to support trade negotiations among market participants. The problem is not the messenger but what it was used for. Conflating a tool that facilitates trading with the act of coordinating auction bids among competitors is a category error. Bid-to-cover ratio rose after goalpost rate benefits were trimmed The period of collusion the commission identified runs from January 2020 to June 2023. That raises an obvious question: was there truly no similar conduct in the decade from 2009 to 2019? Concerns about the system inflating bid-to-cover ratios were raised as early as 2010, pointing to a structural problem that predated the commission's findings. It is not obvious that collusion can be ruled out before 2020. After the commission's investigation began in June 2023, the government announced reforms that gave greater weight to actual underwriting performance. From 2024, it normalized the non-competitive purchase option limits that had been expanded during the pandemic and raised the bonus points awarded for actual underwriting from three to nine. The average bid-to-cover ratio consequently rose from 271 percent in 2023 to 321 percent in 2024. It eased to 267 percent in 2025 but remained well above the levels seen in 2009. Even after trimming some benefits and rewarding actual underwriting more heavily, demand at government bond auctions did not weaken. Yanying and Zigong Yanying, the chief minister of the state of Qi during the Spring and Autumn period, traveled to the state of Chu as an envoy. The king of Chu, seeking to mock him, had a man from Qi who had been caught stealing brought before them and asked: "Are people from Qi naturally inclined to steal?" Yanying replied: "A tangerine grown south of the Huai River is a tangerine. Grown north of it, it becomes a bitter orange. A man who did not steal when he lived in Qi steals when he comes to Chu. Is it not the soil of Chu that turns men into thieves?" This is the story of the tangerine and the bitter orange, recorded in the Yanzi Chunqiu. The Lüshi Chunqiu offers an equally instructive tale about Zigong, a disciple of Confucius. At the time, the state of Lu had a policy of reimbursing anyone who ransomed a fellow citizen from slavery in a foreign land. Zigong, who was wealthy, ransomed a man from Lu but declined to accept the reimbursement. Confucius rebuked him: "From now on, the people of Lu will no longer ransom their countrymen." Declining the payment might seem admirable in the moment. But if people less wealthy than Zigong felt ashamed to accept reimbursement, fewer would bother to ransom enslaved compatriots at all. Confucius was not asking whether it was right or wrong to accept payment for a good deed. He was asking how that payment — or its absence — would shape the behavior of others going forward. The warnings that Campbell and Goodhart issued were already understood by Eastern sages more than two millennia earlier.
Hong Kil-yong Nov. 17, 2026
-
Hundreds of billions in pay: Decoding regulators' masked report on bank holding company chairs
The Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service on Thursday released the results of a special governance inspection of eight bank holding companies, focusing on problems surrounding chief executive officers — the chairs — and the outside directors who hold the power to appoint them. In every specific case cited, however, the regulators identified the companies only by letter codes such as "Holding Company A" or "Holding Company B." For investors in bank holding companies, governance is a core basis for investment decisions. Which holding company had which problem is itself investment-relevant information. Fortunately, the report is fairly detailed — it includes years, headcounts, amounts and dates. Cross-referencing the disclosures against corporate filings, news reports and National Assembly national audit materials allows a reasonable identification of the companies behind most of the letter codes. For investors, it amounts to a kind of exam. What follows works through the report in quiz format, grouping questions by company. The questions are drawn directly from the regulators' report. The answers are reasonable inferences based on public records — they have not been confirmed by the regulators or the companies themselves. Bank holding company chairs: A financial investment aptitude test Q1. Upon the retirement of its former chair, Holding Company A paid a large special merit bonus, then appointed him as an adviser — and for four years paid him an average of 700 million won per year without properly verifying his advisory performance. Which company is A? (Answer) Hana Financial Group (former Chair Kim Jung-tae) Explanation: Hana Financial Group's 2022 annual report shows that Kim's total compensation that year was 4.28 billion won ($3.2 million). The report states that 2.5 billion won of his other income came from the first installment of a 5 billion won special merit bonus — approved by a shareholder vote in recognition of outstanding contributions during his tenure. His severance pay was listed separately at 420 million won. Kim stepped down in March 2022 and continued as an adviser to both the holding company and the bank. Four years of advisory fees at 700 million won per year would amount to roughly 2.8 billion won through March 2026. Q2. Holding Company B appointed its former chair as an adviser and paid an average of 400 million won per year over two years, but did not discuss or review whether extending the contract was appropriate. Which company is B? (Answer) KB Financial Group Explanation: According to materials released Oct. 21 by the office of Democratic Party of Korea lawmaker Kim Yong-man, former KB Financial Group Chair Yoon Jong-kyoo's non-standing management advisory term runs from June 2024 to June 2026, with annual pay set at 400 million won — 80 percent of his base salary at the time of retirement. Both the two-year term and the 400 million won figure match the regulators' description exactly. Since 2023, KB Financial has appointed all 10 executives who retired from the holding company as management advisers within the group, with pay calculated by multiplying the base salary at retirement by a rate that varies by rank: 80 percent for the chair, 70 percent for vice chairs, and 50 to 60 percent for executive and senior vice presidents. Q3. After launching its succession process, Holding Company A amended its internal governance rules the day before finalizing its long list of candidates — changing the maximum age for continued service and thereby extending the sitting chair's possible tenure. Holding Company B made the same type of age-limit change, also before its succession process began. Which companies are A and B? (Answer) A = Hana Financial Group (Chair Ham Young-joo), B = JB Financial Group (Chair Kim Ki-hong) Explanation: On Dec. 2, 2024, Hana Financial amended its internal governance rules to change the tenure limit for a director who turns 70 while in office — from "until the first annual general meeting after that birthday" to "until the first annual general meeting after the current term ends." The amendment extended Ham Young-joo's possible tenure by one year, from March 2027 to March 2028. Ham was born in November 1956. The chair candidate recommendation committee finalized its long list the very next day. Assembly member Park Hong-bae noted at the Oct. 19 national audit that the amendment "was passed without prior notice, the day before the long list was announced." JB Financial Group amended its internal rules in 2023 to allow a director who turns 70 during a term to complete that term. Chair Kim Ki-hong, born in 1957, was 68 when he secured a third consecutive term in March 2025; his current term runs through March 2028. Q4. At Holding Company A, all newly appointed outside directors in 2023 were individuals recommended by the chair while still a chair-designate. One of them was later named chair of the executive candidate recommendation committee in 2025 and oversaw the chair's reappointment process. Which company is A? (Answer) BNK Financial Group Explanation: Bin Dae-in was recommended as chair candidate in January 2023 and took office in March of that year. At the same March shareholder meeting, three new outside directors were appointed: Lee Gwang-ju, Kim Byeong-deok and Jeong Yeong-seok. Outside directors appointed in 2024 and 2025 came through external advisory firms. The 2023 cohort was the exception. Outside director Jeong has served since March 2023 and became chair of the executive candidate recommendation committee in March 2025. The committee launched its succession process in October 2025 and on Dec. 8 recommended Bin as the sole candidate for another term. Q5. At Holding Company B, an outside director was appointed who had been a senior official at an organization the chair had supported during his time as bank president, and who also headed a company that did business with the bank. This director immediately became chair of the outside director recommendation committee. At year-end, during the succession process, the director asked pointed negative questions of two competing candidates while giving the chair the highest score with no questions at all. Which company is B? (Answer) Shinhan Financial Group Explanation: Among the holding companies that have an outside director recommendation committee and whose chair rose from the bank presidency, Shinhan Financial Group and iM Financial Group both fit the profile of appointing someone who immediately became committee chair. However, the description of that chair as "a senior official of an organization and head of a business" points more closely to Shinhan Financial Group. Outside director Yang In-jip served as CEO and chairman of Onicom and held positions including president of the 19th Korea Business Federation in Japan and vice chairman of the Korea-Japan Friendship Association. Chair Jin Ok-dong is a Japan specialist who served as head of the Osaka branch and president of SBJ Bank, and during his time as bank president from 2019 to 2022 had extensive ties to Korea-Japan exchange organizations. Shinhan Financial Group's corporate disclosures state that Yang has "no transactions with the company" — but that refers to the holding company. The Financial Supervisory Service's report refers to transactions with "the bank." Any transactions with Shinhan Bank would not appear in the holding company's disclosures. Q6. At Holding Company C, an outside director who had worked alongside the chair at a previous employer chaired both the board and the executive candidate recommendation committee, leading the succession process for the chair's reappointment and third consecutive term. Which company is C? (Answer) JB Financial Group Explanation: JB Financial Group's annual reports show that outside director Yu Gwan-u chaired the executive candidate recommendation committee for both of Chair Kim Ki-hong's reappointments. At a board meeting on March 28, 2024, Yu was again seated as board chair — giving one person control of both the board chairmanship and the candidate recommendation committee. Both Kim and Yu are alumni of the Financial Supervisory Service, where each rose to the rank of deputy governor. Q7. During the initial selection of its chair, Holding Company D had the candidate's doctoral dissertation supervisor serve as chair of the executive candidate recommendation committee, overseeing the long-list selection and playing a partial role in the succession process. Which company is D? (Answer) iM Financial Group (formerly DGB Financial Group) Explanation: Annual reports show that in the process to select Chair Hwang Byeong-u — a process that began in 2023 and concluded in 2024 — the chair of the candidate recommendation committee was outside director Choi Yong-ho, an emeritus professor at Kyungpook National University and the supervisor of Hwang's doctoral dissertation at the same university. Q8. When appointing two outside directors, Holding Company A identified gaps in its board skill matrix but did not prioritize filling those gaps — instead appointing the two candidates put forward by the holding company's own support division. Both directors subsequently voted unanimously in favor of the chair's reappointment. Which company is A? (Answer) Woori Financial Group Explanation: On Feb. 28, 2024, Woori Financial Group's executive candidate recommendation committee nominated two new outside directors: Lee Eun-ju, a professor of journalism and communication at Seoul National University, and Park Seon-yeong, a professor of economics at Dongguk University. The outside director who had served through 2023 and departed in 2024 was attorney Song Su-yeong — a legal expert whose seat was filled by professors of journalism and economics. On Dec. 29, 2025, all seven outside directors on Woori Financial Group's executive candidate recommendation committee selected Chair Im Jong-ryong as the candidate for the next term. Q9. Holding Company A required external candidates to submit a demanding succession application within five business days, causing most outside candidates to withdraw. Which company is A? (Answer) BNK Financial Group Explanation: The chuseok holiday fell within the candidate application window set by the recommendation committee in October 2025, leaving only four effective business days. The external job posting went up just two days before the deadline. The Financial Supervisory Service conducted an on-site inspection of BNK Financial Group in January 2026. Q10. The Financial Supervisory Service noted that while external recommendations account for a high share of the standing outside director candidate pool, the directors actually appointed tend to come from internal recommendations — and presented the table below. Which holding companies are A, B and C? (Answer) A = KB Financial Group, B = Shinhan Financial Group, C = Hana Financial Group Explanation: The key to solving this question is working backward from the denominators. The "actually appointed" share equals the number of outside directors appointed through external recommendations divided by the total number of outside directors. A share of 22.2 percent implies 2 out of 9; 44.4 percent implies 4 out of 9; 14.3 percent implies 1 out of 7; and 71.4 percent implies 5 out of 7. Holding companies with nine outside directors are Shinhan Financial Group, Hana Financial Group and JB Financial Group; those with seven are KB Financial Group, Woori Financial Group, BNK Financial Group, iM Financial Group and NongHyup Financial Group. KB Financial Group, the likely answer for A, is the only holding company where 100 percent of outside directors — every single one — came through external recommendations. Materials submitted to the National Assembly confirm that all seven current outside directors at KB Financial Group were first recommended by outside specialist firms. Shinhan Financial Group, the likely answer for B, had 80.3 percent of its 2025 outside director candidate pool come from external specialist firms — matching the figure in the table down to the decimal point, according to Shinhan Financial Group's annual governance and compensation report. Hana Financial Group, the likely answer for C, had four of its nine outside directors recommended by sitting outside directors at the time, and one identified by an internal support division. That leaves four appointed through external recommendations, or 44.4 percent. Why the chair's seat is so coveted: three terms can mean hundreds of billions in pay The regulators' findings show that a range of measures — difficult to characterize as transparent — were deployed to secure, retain and extend the tenures of bank holding company chairs. What makes the position worth such effort? As the CEO of a major banking group, the chair wields strong influence through personnel authority. Above all, the compensation earned during a term is substantial — and the longer the tenure, the larger it grows. The Financial Supervisory Service's electronic disclosure system publishes the pay of executives and employees who receive 500 million won or more per year. Adding up only the disclosed figures tells the story. The longer a chair serves, the more compensation layers accumulate. Long-term performance bonuses tied to results three to four years out add considerably to the total. Even after retirement, merit bonuses and advisory fees continue. Financial regulators plan to require financial companies with assets of 2 trillion won or more to present and report individual executive pay plans to shareholders at annual general meetings. They also intend to pursue a clawback system for performance bonuses and broader disclosure of individual compensation. In the Warring States period, there lived in the state of Qi a man named Zou Ji, who was quite confident in his own appearance. One day he asked his wife: "Who is more handsome — me, or Lord Xu who lives north of the city?" His wife naturally said her husband was. He asked his concubine the same question and received the same answer. A guest visiting the house also said Zou Ji was the more handsome. Then one day Zou Ji met Lord Xu in person and knew at once: "Ah — this man is far better looking than I am." He also understood why his wife, his concubine and his guest had answered as they did. "My wife said so because she loves me; my concubine said so because she fears me; my guest said so because he wants something from me." Zou Ji took this insight to King Wei of Qi as a remonstrance. The king offered rewards to those who would criticize him, and Qi grew strong. — Strategies of the Warring States, "Qi Strategies: Zou Ji Admonishes King Wei of Qi" It remains to be seen what effect the remedies the financial regulators put forward will actually have.
Nov. 12, 2026
-
Your gums feel the season change too
Small lifestyle habits go a long way in protecting oral health during seasonal transitions When the seasons change, most people worry first about respiratory ailments like colds and allergies. But dentists see a different pattern: patients coming in with swollen or bleeding gums, worse-than-usual bad breath, or a persistent dry feeling in the mouth. The dry air, wide temperature swings, and disrupted daily routines that come with seasonal transitions can affect oral health more than most people realize. During these periods in particular, dry weather makes it easy for the mouth to lose moisture. Saliva does far more than help swallow food — it flushes away food debris, regulates acidity in the mouth, and shields teeth and gums from external irritants. When saliva production drops and the mouth dries out, bacteria thrive, raising the risk of bad breath, cavities, and gum disease. The first priority for oral care during a seasonal transition is staying well hydrated. Rather than drinking large amounts of water all at once when thirst strikes, it is better to sip small amounts frequently throughout the day. Particular caution is warranted around the habit of reaching for coffee, tea, or carbonated drinks instead of water. Sugary beverages repeatedly expose teeth to an acidic environment, and excessive consumption of caffeinated drinks can intensify the sensation of dry mouth. Brushing technique is also worth revisiting from the basics. Many people assume that brushing three times a day is enough, but frequency alone is not the point — what matters is cleaning teeth and gums thoroughly using the correct method. The area where the teeth meet the gums is especially prone to plaque buildup, so it should never be skipped. Scrubbing too hard in the name of getting a thorough clean can cause its own problems, however. Excessive force can damage the gums or wear away the outer layer of the teeth, leading to sensitivity. Using a soft-bristled toothbrush and applying only as much pressure as the teeth and gums can comfortably tolerate is the better approach. Cleaning between the teeth is equally important. A toothbrush does a good job on tooth surfaces but cannot fully remove food particles and plaque lodged between teeth. Dental floss or interdental brushes, chosen to suit one's own oral condition, help manage plaque in those spaces. If the gums bleed frequently or the gaps between teeth have widened, it is better to consult a dentist about the right oral care routine rather than simply brushing more often. Overusing mouthwash because bad breath seems worse during a seasonal transition is another habit to watch. Bad breath can stem from many causes — dry mouth, plaque and tartar, gum disease, cavities, or a coated tongue — so masking the odor temporarily is less useful than identifying and addressing the underlying cause. Gently cleaning the tongue, drinking enough water, and combining proper brushing with interdental care all help. Tooth sensitivity is another symptom to watch for during seasonal transitions. A brief sharp sensation when drinking cold water or eating cold food is fairly common. But dismissing it as simply a reaction to colder weather can be a mistake. Sensitivity can also signal receding gums that have exposed the tooth root, worn enamel, or a cavity in progress. If sensitivity recurs in the same tooth or the pain intensifies over time, the underlying cause needs to be identified. The appropriate treatment depends on what is causing the pain, so reaching for sensitivity toothpaste alone is not the answer — a dental examination to determine the cause should come first. Seasonal transitions also tend to disrupt routines in ways that make oral care easier to neglect. More travel and outdoor activities mean there are times when brushing after meals simply is not possible, and it is easy to fall asleep after a late-night snack or drink without brushing. Brushing before bed is, if anything, the most important brushing of the day — saliva production slows during sleep, creating ideal conditions for bacteria to multiply. Ultimately, the key to oral health during seasonal transitions lies less in any special regimen than in how consistently one maintains basic everyday habits. Drinking enough water, brushing correctly, using dental floss or interdental brushes, and cutting back on the frequency of sugary snacks and beverages are, on their own, meaningful steps toward protecting oral health. Above all, teeth and gums, once damaged, often cannot recover on their own. If something feels different from usual — bleeding or swollen gums, recurring bad breath, persistent sensitivity or pain — the right response is to see a dentist and find out the cause, rather than waiting and hoping it will pass. Seasonal change comes for everyone, but there is no reason to accept changes in oral health as an inevitable part of it. As the season shifts, it is worth taking stock of the condition of your teeth and gums, not just your respiratory health. Healthy teeth and gums are not built in a single moment — they begin with small habits repeated every day.
Nov. 12, 2026
-
From the field: Photos of Public Procurement Service evaluators leaked
'Nothing happens if you do nothing' The Public Procurement Service held an unscheduled emergency briefing Tuesday morning at the government press room in Daejeon. Under the heading "Rapid Response to Leaked Photos of Procurement Evaluators," officials pledged to focus all efforts on minimizing damage and preventing a recurrence. Most evaluation work in the public procurement market is conducted offline, though smaller-value cases also use online assessments. The leaked photos did not result from an external hack but occurred during the development and testing of an AI system designed to improve the online evaluation process. Photos of 189 evaluators who participated in the online assessments were leaked between July and October when identity-verification photos were uploaded to an external generative AI service. The photos were originally used to monitor whether evaluators were personally conducting their assessments and performing their duties diligently — a function that in offline evaluations is handled by cross-checking evaluators' faces in real time. Fortunately, the investigation found that no personal identification or financial information — including national ID numbers, account numbers or other sensitive data — was included in the leaked material. With no category label identifying the subjects as procurement evaluators, and only photos exposed, the scope of potential harm appears limited. The Public Procurement Service has been actively pursuing a sweeping overhaul of its evaluation system, including the development of an AI-based technology assessment support system, to address problems such as collusion between some evaluators and companies being assessed, as well as evaluators performing their duties negligently. "Nothing happens if you do nothing." Bustling activity inevitably stirs up dust — but dust is only dust. Still, this incident is undoubtedly a reminder to remain vigilant going forward. The agency has faced considerable criticism in recent years after it moved to exclude civil servants entirely from evaluation panels — a departure from the past practice of having them participate directly, accounting for roughly 10 percent of evaluators. Some argued that removing the civil servants most familiar with the evaluation process and leaving it entirely to outside evaluators amounted to a dereliction of duty. Particularly when cases of collusion or misconduct among some evaluators surfaced, the agency also drew mockery for appearing to keep its own hands clean — unwilling to get involved yet eager to avoid blame. Setting aside such criticism, the Public Procurement Service has continued its efforts to ensure fair and transparent assessments in the public market. Its current initiatives — including a pilot launch of AI-based technology evaluation and a push to establish a dedicated procurement evaluation institute — fit squarely within that broader direction.
Nov. 10, 2026
-
Will a Democratic blue tsunami kill AI? Five things to study, not fear
In the winter of 383 AD, the armies of Former Qin, led by Fu Jian, faced the Eastern Jin across the Fei River. Former Qin had mobilized a force said to number more than 800,000 men, against Eastern Jin's 80,000. Flush from earlier victories, the Eastern Jin commanders sent word to their opponents: "Cross the river and face us head-on — but first pull your lines back so we have room to land." Fu Jian calculated that a frontal battle with his overwhelming numbers could only end in his favor. He planned to unleash his cavalry once the Jin forces were halfway across. He ordered his troops to fall back. As the Qin army began to withdraw, Zhu Xu — a former Eastern Jin general captured by Former Qin — shouted from behind the lines: "Qin is defeated!" The troops, executing a deliberate tactical retreat, believed the cry and dissolved into panic. Fear spreads fast. Large armies are hard to control. In ancient warfare, once a formation broke, no amount of manpower could hold it together. Former Qin suffered catastrophic losses. Internal rebellions followed the defeat, and Fu Jian was captured and killed in 385 by Yao Chang of Later Qin, a former subordinate. Former Qin itself fell in 394. Many voters who resented Donald Trump likely cheered for the Democrats in the US midterm elections. Yet the outcome so many hoped for is now rattling financial markets. The culprit is the Democratic Party's AI regulation campaign pledge, shaped in response to public opinion. Markets have begun pricing in the fear that the AI ecosystem built up over recent years could be destabilized. Has the situation really changed enough to bring down the AI industry? The fear that Democrats will regulate AI and block data center construction has taken on the character of a full-blown panic. The most dangerous thing in investing is a hasty assumption. What is needed is a forecast grounded in an accurate reading of the situation, and what matters most is an appropriate response to new developments. Below is a summary of what the midterm results mean, the AI regulation variable, supply-demand dynamics and investment strategy. More than a Democratic landslide — a Trump collapse To put it bluntly, the reason Trump won the presidential election two years ago was Democratic economic incompetence. This midterm is a Democratic landslide, but more precisely it is a Trump collapse. The Democrats did not do anything particularly well — the Republicans failed. Fiscal deficits were a problem even under Democratic rule, and it was the Joe Biden administration that missed the window on fighting inflation. Populism has often proved a dangerous variable for economies. Britain voted to leave the EU. Germany abandoned nuclear power, grew dependent on Russian energy, failed to make the electric vehicle transition and is now grappling with inflation. Europe, having tightened regulations in pursuit of green goals and fairness, is falling behind the United States in technology and China in manufacturing competitiveness. The US president wields considerable power. The veto can block legislation. No matter how thoroughly Democrats control both chambers of Congress, they cannot claim to be stronger than Trump, who holds executive authority — particularly on tariffs and diplomacy, including matters of war. The power of the purse is Congress's greatest lever, but reckless use of it that damages the economy could trigger a backlash at the presidential election two years from now. Overregulating data centers could be a trap of their own making Data centers are a core engine of US economic growth. The investment involved is among the largest in history, generating demand and employment across a wide range of industries — construction, power infrastructure and beyond. The Federal Reserve has been paying close attention to the productivity gains AI could bring to the broader economy. Would a Democratic-controlled Congress and state governments really win the next presidential election after hobbling the AI growth engine? Most hyperscalers are Big Tech companies, which carry the largest share of the US stock market. Semiconductor firms and other companies that make up the AI ecosystem also account for a significant portion of market capitalization. American households hold large equity positions, and a drop in share prices would crimp consumption and deal a serious blow to the economy — a metric nearly as politically sensitive as inflation. Trump said Thursday, just after markets plunged, "401(k) retirement accounts have been wiped out. Blame the Democrats." Both Democrats and Republicans agree that China must be kept in check. The area where China is most disadvantaged relative to the United States in AI is computing power. China is encouraging data center construction at the national level. Because it is not a democracy, it faces far less resistance from local communities or public opinion. Its power supply is considerably more ample than America's, and opposition to building transmission grids between regions is comparatively limited. If the United States slows data center construction and tightens AI regulation, China stands to gain the most. It is important to understand what Americans actually think. Negative sentiment toward data centers likely reflects a demand for safeguards against side effects rather than outright opposition. Until now, the terms of data center contracts between the government and hyperscalers have been kept confidential. If those terms were disclosed transparently and communication with local communities expanded in the process, negative public opinion could soften. A measured slowdown in AI investment could be a breakthrough for market supply and demand Before the AI revolution, the US economy was driven by consumption rather than manufacturing, and investment was concentrated mainly in software. Money that companies earned flowed back through households into financial markets. Major US companies, unburdened by heavy fixed costs such as capital expenditure, channeled vast free cash flows into shareholder returns — which also flowed back through financial markets. In short, money circulated well within financial markets. With the rise of AI, America's flagship companies began pouring money into large-scale tangible assets such as data centers. Semiconductors, power and water were all in short supply. Scarce resources command a premium. Big Tech firms that had been generating enormous profits began directing that money not back into financial markets but into the real economy — and overseas. Borrowing to invest was no longer enough; they have recently begun issuing new shares to raise fresh capital. Rather than buying back stock as they once did, they have flipped to issuing both equities and bonds to pull in funding. If data center construction slows, the amount of capital that needs to be raised from financial markets will shrink, improving supply-demand conditions. Permitting delays and longer construction timelines that drive up costs will hit financially weaker neo-cloud operators first. Conversely, Big Tech firms that already own data centers will find themselves in an environment where supply constraints allow them to raise service prices. There is a real possibility of consolidation, with Big Tech acquiring neo-cloud assets — and if acquired cheaply, that would only deepen Big Tech's market dominance. For now, US Treasuries; once the war ends, US equities The midterms have thrown a long list of unresolved challenges into sharp relief — AI regulation, fiscal policy, war and more. The outcomes are hard to predict at this point. This is a situation defined more by uncertainty than by calculable risk. With uncertainty running high, safe assets look relatively more attractive than risk assets for now. The yield gap between equities and bonds is also narrow. The yield on 10-year US Treasuries, among the lowest-credit-risk assets available, stands at around 4.8 percent annually. Rates rising would mean capital losses, but a decline in rates would offer the prospect of price gains as well. The recent surge in volatility in US equities — which had been holding up relatively well — owes more to tangled supply-demand dynamics than to any change in fundamentals, compounded by the unwinding of hedge fund and derivatives positions. If the pressure to invest in AI eases and investors rebalance their positions, volatility could subside. The key variable is interest rates. A reduction in hyperscaler fundraising would create an incentive to push Treasury yields lower. With an eye on the presidential election two years away, both Democrats and Republicans will need to pursue policies that cool inflation. If that causes the Federal Reserve to pause or delay its rate-hiking cycle, it would be a tailwind for equity markets. South Korea must see past the semiconductor illusion — for the domestic market, automobiles matter more The record earnings posted by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix reflect higher prices, not higher volumes. According to the Bank of Korea, semiconductor export volumes rose 30.5 percent year-on-year in September, but export prices surged 182.1 percent. That is a structure where prices can fall just as quickly if demand weakens. Sustainable pricing power requires both volume and price to grow together. Right now, the industry is holding the blade, not the handle. Samsung Electronics and SK hynix rank among the best in the semiconductor industry in terms of technology and production competitiveness — that deserves genuine recognition. Even so, their governance is opaque and shareholder returns are stingy. The labor relations model — where astronomical performance bonuses are paid out to employees at a fixed ratio of profits driven not by higher output but purely by higher prices — is unusual by global standards. Viewed with cold objectivity, there are plenty of reasons why the market assigns these companies valuations that seem almost absurdly low. In truth, for South Korea's domestic stock market to rally sustainably, what needs to improve is not semiconductors but industries with stronger upstream and downstream linkage effects — automobiles being the prime example. According to the Bank of Korea's 2023 input-output table, the influence coefficient — which measures how much an increase in demand for one industry stimulates production in others — stands at 1.335 for automobiles and 0.793 for semiconductors. The employment-inducing coefficient is also higher for autos: 1.0 job per 1 billion won ($745,000) of output, compared with 0.7 for semiconductors. Yet the automotive sector is now hemmed in on all sides. Chinese rivals are squeezing electric vehicles, American companies are pulling ahead in self-driving cars, and Japan holds the edge in hybrids. A strong won, driven by the semiconductor trade surplus, adds another headwind. Automakers played a significant role in the Kospi rally in the first half of this year. Hyundai Motor's share price rose 66.9 percent from the end of last year, while Kia gained 13.3 percent — driven less by core automotive performance than by excitement over Boston Dynamics' robot and physical AI business. For the domestic market to sustain its upward momentum, the "real" auto business needs to improve. The budget for next year, drawn up aggressively on the assumption that the semiconductor boom will continue, is also a concern. The government has decided to set total expenditure for 2027 at 820.9 trillion won, an increase of 12.8 percent from this year. Tax revenue is projected at 584.4 trillion won, up 194.2 trillion won, reflecting higher corporate tax receipts from the semiconductor boom. How deeply does the government actually understand the economic distortions created by the concentration of semiconductor-driven gains? Looking at the reality, politicians excel only at taking credit, while bureaucrats are practiced at telling them what they want to hear. If the semiconductor boom fades, tax revenue projections will be the first thing to unravel. Budgets, once expanded, are not easily cut. It is hard not to think of those who grew so excited about a rosy future unlocked by the semiconductor boom.
Nov. 7, 2026
-
5 financial lessons from President Lee's seller-financed home sale
① A shortfall in the co-owner's holding period threatened the buyer's right to inherit cooperative membership — resolved by transferring title before receiving the remaining balance. ② If the interest-free benefit is split equally between the two buyers, each share falls just below the gift-tax exemption threshold. ③ A seller claiming the long-term holding deduction may net more after tax by adding the financing benefit to the sale price rather than charging interest. ④ The sale was concluded before the government announced reforms to the long-term holding deduction and property-tax rules, locking in current tax benefits. ⑤ Living in the presidential residence, Lee faces no urgency to secure new housing after the sale. The joint-ownership variable — and how seller financing cleared it On July 17, 2017, President Lee Jae Myung and his wife Kim Hye-kyung appeared together on the SBS variety program "Dongsang Imong 2 — You Are My Destiny." During a meal, Kim turned to Lee, who was then serving as Seongnam mayor, and said: "There isn't even a house in my name." She was asking to be added as a co-owner. Lee replied: "You already own me." The home in question was an apartment in Bundang's Yangji Village. About 16 months after that broadcast, on Nov. 29, 2018, Kim received a half-share of the property as a gift. Nearly seven years and eight months later, the couple sold the apartment through seller financing — a method in which the seller extends credit to the buyer in lieu of a conventional mortgage. The transaction brought seller financing, previously known only to a small circle of specialists, into wide public awareness. Lee and Kim signed a sale contract on July 14 for 2.9 billion won ($2.16 million) and transferred ownership on July 16. The unpaid balance of 1.48 billion won was to be held until the end of October. The maximum secured amount on the mortgage registered against that balance — approximately 1.77 billion won — was discharged Tuesday. The discharge application was filed Saturday, effectively closing the transaction. The reason Lee moved quickly to transfer title has been attributed to the need to preserve the buyer's right to inherit cooperative membership in the reconstruction project. The designation and announcement of the project operator for Yangji Village took place on July 27 — 11 days after the ownership transfer. In a reconstruction project carried out through a trust arrangement in a speculative-pressure zone, transferring membership status after the project operator designation is subject to restrictions. Unless an exemption applies, ownership must change hands before July 27 for the buyer to inherit cooperative membership. There is, however, an exemption. A single-household homeowner who has held the property for at least 10 years and lived in it for at least five may transfer cooperative membership even after the announcement. Lee acquired the apartment in 1998, held it for about 28 years and lived there for more than five. Had the property been registered in his name alone, he could have relied on that exemption and transferred membership after the announcement. The complication arose from the joint ownership. The long-term holding and residency exemption is assessed separately for each transferor. Kim received her half-share as a gift and had not yet held it for 10 years. The buyers, too, are a couple holding the property jointly. No interest on the balance — and staying below the gift-tax threshold When announcing the sale, Cheong Wa Dae said the couple had agreed to waive interest on the deferred balance and that any gift-tax implications would be handled in accordance with applicable rules. Han Moon-do, a professor who appeared alongside the couple on the official presidential broadcast, cited consideration for the buyers and the short duration of the deferral as reasons for the interest-free arrangement. Under tax law, the standard interest rate used to calculate the benefit from an interest-free personal loan is 4.6 percent per year. If the calculated benefit falls below 10 million won, it is exempt from taxation. Applying 4.6 percent to 1.48 billion won over 107 days — from July 16 through Oct. 31 — yields an implied interest amount of approximately 19.96 million won. That figure is an estimate, as the actual date of the final payment has not been confirmed. If the debt and the financial benefit are each split equally between the two buyers, each share comes to roughly 9.98 million won, just under the 10 million won exemption threshold. Im Gwang-hyeon, who was National Tax Service commissioner at the time of the transaction and is now chief of staff at Cheong Wa Dae, told the National Assembly's national audit on Oct. 13 that the agency had reviewed publicly available information and concluded the transaction did not appear to be subject to taxation. The gift-tax obligation, if any, falls on the buyers who received the financial benefit. Did the couple's "consideration" save the buyers nearly 20 million won in interest costs? Interest on a personal loan is typically treated as income from a non-business lending arrangement and subject to withholding tax of 25 percent — 27.5 percent including local income tax. On 20 million won in interest, the withholding amount would be 5.5 million won. The final tax burden could vary depending on how the income is aggregated with other financial income. For a seller of a single home who qualifies for the long-term holding special deduction, reflecting the value of the financing arrangement in the sale price rather than charging interest may produce a better after-tax return. The relevant comparison is not the average effective tax rate on the total capital gain, but the incremental capital gains tax triggered by a higher sale price. If raising the sale price by 20 million won generates less additional capital gains tax than the tax on 20 million won of interest income, the seller nets more after tax by the difference. Interest income or a higher sale price — which pays more? Does the math actually work out that way? A precise calculation is impossible without full information, but a rough estimate is instructive. For a single-household homeowner, capital gains tax applies only to the portion of the gain attributable to the amount exceeding 1.2 billion won of the total sale price. With a holding period and residency period each of at least 10 years, the long-term holding special deduction reaches a maximum of 80 percent. Assuming an original acquisition price of approximately 360 million won, Lee's share at one-half and no deduction for necessary expenses, the estimated capital gains tax owed by Lee — including local tax — comes to approximately 39.38 million won. If the total sale price rises by 20 million won and Lee's share of the proceeds increases by 10 million won, the additional capital gains tax would be roughly 730,000 won — about 2.02 million won less than the 2.75 million won that would be withheld on 10 million won of interest income. Kim received her half-share as a gift in November 2018 and moved to Incheon in the first half of 2022. If she did not live in the apartment after that, her estimated long-term holding deduction rate — based on a seven-year holding period and three-year residency — would be 40 percent. Assuming the assessed value of her share at the time of the gift was 500 million won and applying no deduction for necessary expenses, her capital gains tax, including local tax, is estimated at approximately 117.39 million won. Under the same assumptions, if Kim's share of the proceeds rises by 10 million won, the additional capital gains tax would be roughly 2.27 million won — about 480,000 won less than the 2.75 million won withheld on 10 million won of interest. The buyers, for their part, would pay more in acquisition tax on a higher sale price. If the standard tax rate applies to this apartment, a 20 million won increase in the sale price would add a combined 700,000 won in acquisition tax, local education tax and special rural development tax. This comparison assumes the same amount is received either as interest or as a higher sale price. Whether the actual sale price of 2.9 billion won already incorporated a premium for the financing arrangement has not been confirmed. A preview of the tax reform that would have cut these benefits The real estate tax reform plan the government announced in August shifts the long-term holding special deduction away from rewarding long ownership toward rewarding long residency. Under the plan, the deduction for single-household homeowners — currently 4 percent per year for holding and 4 percent per year for residency — would change to 2 percent and 6 percent respectively by 2028, with only the residency component remaining at 8 percent per year from 2029 onward. A cap on the total deduction amount would also be introduced. The comprehensive real estate tax reform would expand the basic deduction for owner-occupiers of a single home while raising the fair market value ratio and capping the tax credit. These are the terms of the government bill currently under National Assembly review. Living in the official residence — no rush to find the next home For a single homeowner currently living in the property, the calculation becomes more complicated. Someone who has held the home for a long time but lived there only briefly may find it advantageous to sell before 2028, when the deduction cuts begin. Continuing to live there would accumulate more residency-based deductions, but for high-value properties the deduction cap could bite, or the property-tax burden could grow substantially. A sitting president lives in the official residence, so selling the family home creates no immediate need to find new housing. Ordinary homeowners, by contrast, must weigh the purchase price and acquisition tax on a new home, or the deposit and rent on a jeonse and monthly rent arrangement. The presidential couple sold their Bundang apartment under the current tax regime — but the ability to sell and simply wait, without scrambling for a new place to live, is not a condition most people share.
Nov. 3, 2026
-
'Herald Invitation' — Nam Sung-hyun, former Korea Forest Service chief
Pine wilt disease must be declared a national disaster — and a second greening movement must begin Over more than four decades as a forest official and, later, as chief of the Korea Forest Service, I witnessed firsthand how South Korea's forests were transformed. Looking back, the past 50 years were nothing short of miraculous. Through the devoted participation of every citizen and relentless pan-government effort, the barren, denuded hills and fields of this country have been reborn as the lush, verdant and beautiful forests the world now envies. This is more than a recovery of nature — it is a great national achievement forged by a people united as one. Yet today, the precious forests we built with blood and sweat face a grave threat: pine wilt disease, known as the "AIDS of pine trees" and the "silent wildfire" that reduces forests to ash. This terrifying acute infectious disease has no treatment once a tree is infected and carries a fatality rate of 100 percent. It has been spreading with even greater ferocity as it intersects with the climate crisis. Particularly alarming is that the disease has now moved well beyond ordinary forests, penetrating national parks — the ecological backbone of the Baekdudaegan mountain range — cultural heritage protection zones steeped in history and tradition, and the forests immediately surrounding communities where people live their daily lives. The country now faces a national crisis of spreading infection. Pine wilt disease can no longer be dismissed as a mere forest pest. It demands the same highest-level sense of urgency as foot-and-mouth disease or avian influenza (AI) outbreaks, which inflict enormous damage on the national economy and people's livelihoods. Beyond that, it must be formally designated a natural and social disaster under the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety, just as wildfires and landslides are. Only then can the scientific, systematic "prevention-preparedness-response-recovery" manual at the heart of the national disaster management framework be rigorously applied to pine wilt disease control. The current lethal pace of spread has reached a point where the Korea Forest Service and local government forestry departments cannot contain it on their own. The government must immediately declare the highest level — Serious — under the national crisis alert system, which runs from Attention through Caution and Alert to Serious, and respond accordingly. Just as the entire nation mobilizes under a state of emergency when livestock epidemics strike, the central government and all relevant agencies must tear down the walls between ministries and commit every available budget and personnel resource to a full pan-government response. Only by treating this as a national disaster and acting preemptively can the chain of transmission be broken. Alongside an all-out government response, nothing matters more than public awareness and active participation. With the same urgent spirit that drove earlier generations to plant trees on bare mountains, the nation must now launch a pan-national "second greening movement" to protect its forests and pine trees from this deadly disaster. The prerequisite is a shift in public consciousness — a break from what might be called the "tragedy of the commons." Today's forests are more than shared land; they are where people live, work and rest. Only when every citizen feels a sense of ownership — treating the forest as a precious personal asset — will people voluntarily step forward to fight climate disasters and pine wilt disease. The practical steps are close at hand. When hiking on a weekend or walking near a residential area, anyone who spots pine trees with reddening needles or signs of dying should report it immediately — a single call to the forestry department of the relevant city, county or district, or to the Korea Forest Service's dedicated pine wilt disease control call center at 1588-3249, is all it takes. In addition, the government and local authorities must significantly expand the pine wilt disease reporting reward program to build a dense, voluntary prevention network woven into everyday life. The forests are the fruit of the sweat and tears of those who came before us. Now it falls to us to defend them, under the banner of pan-government action and a second greening movement.
Nov. 3, 2026
-
[Biz Insight] In feedback, even the noise is worth hearing
Business, it is often said, is the sum of decisions and their execution. Execution must be continuously observed to produce good outcomes — and frequently requires active management. Communication is what intervenes in that process, fostering cooperation within an organization while reducing misunderstanding and conflict. It continues through feedback after execution, allowing plans to be revised and refined to fit conditions on the ground. All of it is in service of achieving the best possible results. A leader's ability to listen plays a central role in the feedback process. Practicing and internalizing that skill is essential. The moment a leader says "I already know" or "That's enough," communication breaks down and teamwork risks falling apart. In a company, strategic goals are broken down into specific tasks at the team level. Robust feedback pulls those pieces back together. Without feedback and listening, there is no way to know whether top-level strategy and ground-level tasks are moving in the same direction — and hitting targets becomes that much harder. It goes without saying that business is driven by the people who manage assets, not the assets themselves. Human affairs, by their nature, depend on the give-and-take of communication. People differ in experience, knowledge and perspective — and in how they think. Feedback and listening are the process of accepting those differences, making sense of them and finding ways to improve. Bridging those differences to build cooperation requires open expression of views, receptiveness and bottom-up decision-making. That is why informal feedback — rather than structured reporting — matters so much, and why bottom-up, upward decision-making continues to be emphasized. Even unintended messages that surface during feedback — the noise — need not be filtered out. These are the kinds of remarks that fall into the "that's enough" category mentioned earlier. Unpolished and unfiltered, they are also the most candid voices from the field, and they can be the most valuable clues for decisions that truly resonate. Strip away planning and performance management from the business process, and what remains is execution, feedback and listening — all shaped by the volume of human interaction and communication. HR professionals have long stressed that the quantity and quality of that interaction determine whether a business succeeds or fails. The technique known as "active listening" was introduced 70 years ago by Carl Rogers and Richard Farson in 1957, yet it remains as relevant as ever. The reason it endures is simple: it is genuinely difficult to master.
Nov. 3, 2026
-
'Moving goalposts' and the Northeast Asia forward-base theory: the real stakes of OPCON transfer
It is an undeniable historical fact that the South Korea-US alliance has underpinned peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for more than 70 years, serving as a cornerstone of South Korea's prosperity and democratization. The deterrence provided by USFK and the combined defense framework remain a solid pillar of South Korea's security. The foundational agreement to pursue the transfer of wartime operational control — not on a unilateral timetable but on the basis of conditions — carries sound logic: to systematically verify the effectiveness of combined defense and the South Korean military's capacity to lead operations. Yet as the recent national audit made clear, the atmosphere surrounding the OPCON verification process gives cause for deep concern. The controversy over so-called "moving goalposts" reached a peak when USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson suggested at a Washington seminar that existing evaluation criteria should be revisited in light of North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities and a changed security environment. Items previously assessed as fulfilled have been reversed, and the list of evaluation requirements has grown — with "changing circumstances" serving as a pretext to arbitrarily raise the bar and add new thresholds. A clear line must be drawn between the off-the-cuff remarks of a field commander and official US government policy. If the accumulated national consensus built by the two countries' leaders can be shaken by a single soldier's words, the credibility of the alliance suffers lasting damage. Even more troubling is the way this atmosphere is feeding into what can only be called "security-anxiety marketing" by certain domestic forces. Stoking fear that an OPCON transfer would immediately create a security vacuum, casting doubt on the South Korean military's capabilities, and parroting only the hawkish line from the US military establishment — this is defeatist distrust of military sovereignty and a self-defeating act that undermines the nation's own negotiating leverage. Behind the controversy lies America's sweeping Indo-Pacific hegemonic strategy. For a United States focused on checking China, the Korean Peninsula is more than a defensive line against North Korea — it is a strategic hub within the region. Once a future combined forces command led by a South Korean general takes shape, the operation of USFK would be strictly bound to its original purpose of defending the Korean Peninsula, and it is precisely this constraint that the United States is reluctant to accept. If the Cold War-era model of restricting an ally's military sovereignty in exchange for security guarantees is still at work, South Korea must make an unequivocal declaration of sovereign will: it will not be locked in as America's Northeast Asian forward base. The military rationale behind endlessly expanding technical requirements also deserves hard scrutiny. South Korea's armed forces have already acquired a substantial volume of advanced US-made assets — F-35A stealth fighters, Global Hawk high-altitude reconnaissance drones, ballistic missile early-warning radars — and have demonstrated more than sufficient interoperability for combined operations. Yet demands continue for new platforms and additional force requirements, justified by the need to integrate AI-based systems such as Maven and apply new operational plans. One cannot help but wonder whether the alliance's security logic is being distorted into an endless purchase order driven by the commercial interests of the US defense industry. The OPCON transfer cannot be left to languish indefinitely in a tug-of-war of working-level negotiations and elastic standards. The upcoming Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) is a decisive turning point at which this tangled knot must be cut. On the basis of a strategic agreement between the two commanders-in-chief, the defense authorities must use the SCM to secure a firm political and strategic decision — one that definitively confirms and announces the completion of the OPCON transfer by 2028. This is not a repudiation of conditions-based OPCON transfer (COPT). The South Korean military's core leading capabilities have already been demonstrated through the first and second phases of verification. It is entirely reasonable to redefine the latest technology requirements arising from a rapidly changing battlefield environment — not as prerequisites for the transfer, but as joint capability-development tasks to be pursued by South Korea and the United States together under the future combined command after the transfer. In addition, if the future combined command's command agreement and operational plans firmly embed, as a matter of institutional commitment, the continued stationing of USFK and the US pledge to provide extended deterrence forces, much of the domestic security anxiety can be substantially addressed. Of course, meticulous contingency planning must also be prepared, given the inherent variability of diplomatic and military negotiations. Should agreement on a single target year prove difficult, South Korea must secure as its negotiating floor at minimum a roadmap that specifies a target window of 2028 to 2029 and explicitly separates new technology requirements from preconditions. Only by nailing down a binding timetable that forecloses indefinite delay can further "goalpost-moving" by working-level officials be stopped. The true strength of combined defense rests on a self-reliant foundation on which South Korea defends its own territory and sovereignty. The OPCON transfer is not a weakening of the alliance — it is a leap toward a mature partnership in which authority and responsibility are fully shared. This is not something to be deferred indefinitely under the shelter of the alliance. It is a generational task to be resolved with confidence, grounded in the constitutional authority of the commander-in-chief and in mutual trust between allies. Seo Nam-yeol is chairman of the Korea Defense and Security Forum.
Nov. 2, 2026
-
[Op-ed] Park Jeong-suk, CEO of Seoul Foundation of Women and Family
Relationship-based crimes must be treated as a public safety issue, not a private dispute The Act on Punishment of Stalking Crimes has now been in force for five years. Enacted in the wake of the 2021 triple murder in Nowon, the law has done little to stem the tide: harrowing stalking cases continue to fill the news. Stalking is one form of what are broadly called relationship-based crimes — violence and criminal acts committed within intimate relationships, including between romantic partners, spouses and family members. Dating violence and domestic violence are the most common examples. Because perpetrators are familiar with victims' daily routines and home addresses, the threat can persist even after a relationship ends. The very intimacy of the bond makes it hard to break free, and victims often face greater danger during the process of ending the relationship itself. It is time to stop treating relationship-based crimes as private disputes and to recognize them as a public safety problem that society must address together. These crimes rarely take a single form. Stalking frequently escalates into threats, assault, home invasion and other offenses. Data from the Seoul One-Stop Support Center for Stalking Victims illustrates the scope of the problem. Of the more than 1,300 people who used the center from its opening in 2023 through 2026, 69.1 percent were harmed by a current or former intimate partner. The range of offenses recorded was wide: 417 cases of threats, insults or extortion; 255 cases of assault; and 177 cases of dating violence, among others. The figures make clear that viewing each incident in isolation makes it impossible to fully understand what victims are living through. The deeper problem is how difficult it is to escape the violence. Surveillance and threats can continue long after a breakup, and some victims — fearing retaliation — are reluctant to seek help or to push for the perpetrator's punishment. That reluctance does not mean no harm was done. It reflects a complicated mix of emotions: a desire not to destroy the relationship entirely, and a pervasive sense of anxiety. Punishment alone cannot resolve these situations. What is needed is a sustained protection system that respects victims' wishes while connecting them to counseling, legal aid, medical care and residential support. To meet that public need, the center operates in close coordination with police. While police handle the investigation and protective measures, the center focuses on helping victims rebuild their daily lives — providing psychological counseling, medical and legal support, and relocation assistance to help them find safe housing. Particularly high-risk victims receive dedicated, ongoing case management. From the center's opening in 2023 through September 2026, more than 1,300 people used its services, with total support cases reaching more than 14,000. The center's support caseload in 2026 rose approximately 99.2 percent compared with the same period the previous year — a figure that underscores how great the demand still is and how urgently sustained, systematic public support is needed. Relationship-based crimes must never be minimized, and the need for protection must not disappear simply because a victim does not wish to pursue punishment. What is urgently needed is public support that respects victims' choices without abandoning their safety — support that goes beyond closing a case and takes responsibility for restoring a person's everyday life. The center will continue working to close the gaps in protection, so that it can stand as a reliable safety net at victims' side. Only when victims are freed from fear and reclaim their daily lives will public safety truly move one step closer.
Nov. 2, 2026
-
Tesla merger raises question: what is shareholder voting power worth?
Two notable succession moves — one in South Korea, one in the United States — have recently drawn attention. Cerajem is attempting to replace family management with a professional executive, while Elon Musk is moving to transform a publicly listed company into one effectively controlled by his own family. Cerajem's case carries lessons for mid-sized and small and medium-sized enterprises that struggle with succession and inheritance when no obvious heir exists. Musk's move offers another window into the US startup and technology ecosystem, where founders are routinely granted outsized voting rights. It raises the question of how far a founder's dominance should extend, and how ordinary shareholders on the other side of that equation should be protected. It also invites reflection on South Korea's own debate over dual-class shares, which has so far focused almost exclusively on defending against hostile takeovers. Why Cerajem chose adoption over a gift — joint inheritance tax liability There is a little-known principle embedded in South Korea's inheritance tax law: co-heirs bear joint and several liability for one another's inheritance tax obligations. Each heir can pay another heir's tax bill, up to the value of the estate they themselves received or stand to receive. With that in mind, the reasoning behind Cerajem's unusual succession structure becomes clearer. Cerajem founder and Chairman Lee Hwan-seong adopted the company's professional CEO, Lee Kyung-su, as an adult heir last year. The chairman has an only daughter, who is understood not to be involved in running the company. A straightforward gift of shares was an option, but the company chose adoption instead. Under civil law, an adopted child holds the same inheritance rights as a biological child, making Lee Kyung-su a co-heir alongside the chairman's existing family — and bringing him within the scope of joint tax liability. Separating business control from family assets — LG Group set the precedent If company shares make up a large portion of the estate, Lee Kyung-su would face a substantial inheritance tax bill on those shares. He could also cover other co-heirs' tax obligations, up to the value of what he himself inherits — and such payments on behalf of co-heirs are not treated as a separate taxable gift. The model, in essence, uses adoption to separate the person who inherits the business from those who inherit other assets, with the business successor absorbing the tax burden for the rest. There is already a precedent. LG Group Chairman Koo Kwang-mo was registered as the adopted son of the late Chairman Koo Bon-moo and inherited most of the LG Corp. shares tied to management control. He is understood to have agreed to cover the inheritance tax obligations of the other co-heirs. The key difference with Cerajem is that it adopted someone from outside the family. How Lee Kyung-su will fund his inheritance tax bill remains an open question. Cerajem is understood to have explored an initial public offering several years ago, and if a listing is pursued again, monetizing shares could provide the necessary funds. Tesla + SpaceX = a Musk family company Where Cerajem has chosen to preserve management continuity over bloodline, the world's wealthiest person is taking an entirely different path. Elon Musk is pushing to merge Tesla and SpaceX. As of Thursday, Tesla's market cap stood at approximately $1.48 trillion and SpaceX's at approximately $1.97 trillion. Based on those figures, SpaceX's existing shareholders would hold roughly 57 percent of the combined company's economic interest, with Tesla's existing shareholders holding roughly 43 percent. Musk owns approximately 19.8 percent of Tesla; the remaining roughly 80.2 percent belongs to ordinary shareholders. He is both CEO and the largest single shareholder, but he cannot act unilaterally — in theory, if that 80.2 percent were to act collectively, it could check him. SpaceX, by contrast, grants Class B shares 10 votes each. Through that structure, Musk exercises voting power far exceeding his economic stake. Class B shares automatically convert to Class A if transferred to anyone else, except in permitted circumstances — a structure that makes his control difficult to dilute. If the merger is priced purely on market cap, Tesla's ordinary shareholders would effectively surrender the collective voting power they hold over the company's direction. Individually they are minority shareholders, but together they own 80.2 percent — making them, as a group, Tesla's ultimate controlling force. The central question of any merger, then, is what price to put on that collective control. The premium on Tesla shareholders' collective control is the key variable The United States and South Korea use different frameworks for setting merger ratios. In the US, the share price before a merger announcement and average prices over a given period are important reference points, but not the final word. Valuations draw on discounted cash flow analysis, comparable company multiples, precedent transactions, and assessments of business outlook and synergies. There are cases where ordinary shareholders' voting rights have been assigned significant value. When Paramount merged with Skydance in 2024, Paramount had approximately 40.7 million Class A shares carrying voting rights and approximately 611 million Class B shares that carried no voting rights in principle. The negotiated terms offered Class A holders either $23 in cash or 1.5333 shares in the combined company, while Class B holders were offered either $15 in cash or one share in the new company. Class A shares — those with voting rights — were offered a price 53.3 percent higher than Class B. That gap cannot be attributed entirely to voting rights, however; it also reflects differences in liquidity, governance changes and opportunity costs. Markets are already pricing in a premium of as much as 35 percent. Using Tesla's closing price of $374.58 on Thursday and SpaceX's current market cap as a baseline, a simple calculation shows that at a 10 percent premium, each Tesla share would be worth $412.04 in the merger and Tesla's existing shareholders would hold a 45.3 percent economic stake in the combined company. At 20 percent, those figures rise to $449.50 and 47.5 percent; at 30 percent, to $486.95 and 49.5 percent; and at 35 percent, to $505.68 and 50.4 percent. South Korea is also moving toward a US-style merger valuation standard — but what about voting rights? Many Korean investors hold Tesla shares, so the merger ratio is far from an abstract foreign matter. Starting Dec. 9, South Korea will significantly overhaul the way merger valuations are calculated for listed companies. Rather than mechanically anchoring the price to a share's value at a specific point in time, companies will be required to apply a "fair value" standard that weighs share price alongside asset value, earnings value and other factors. Boards will need to prepare a written opinion reviewing the merger's purpose, expected benefits and the appropriateness of the valuation, while external appraisers will be required to assess not just the price but the fairness of the overall transaction terms. The specific merger pricing formulas previously set out in the enforcement decree will be removed. The intent is to ensure that a company's intrinsic value is properly assessed — and to prevent parties from suppressing a share price at a strategic moment to engineer a favorable merger ratio. The question now becomes: what counts as "fair value"? The revised law specifies "share price, asset value, earnings value and other factors" — the word "other" meaning the list is not exhaustive. Since external appraisers are required to examine the fairness of transaction terms as a whole, there is room to consider additional forms of economic value. What remains absent, however, is any explicit standard for calculating the value of the collective voting power or control that ordinary shareholders hold as a group, or for reflecting that value in merger terms. The government is separately pursuing a mandatory tender offer regime, designed to give ordinary shareholders a share of the control premium when a company changes hands. The specific threshold has not been finalized, but the direction is to set the statutory floor — the minimum the presidential decree may require — at more than 50 percent plus one share. That raises an obvious question about mergers: if ordinary shareholders must be given a slice of the control premium when management control is sold, should the collective control they surrender through a merger go unvalued? If voting rights are recognized as having worth, it could also help address the persistent "Korea discount" in domestic equity markets.
Oct. 26, 2026
-
Solidigm IPO on hold, but SK hynix's dual-listing risk lingers
Despite SK hynix's announcement that it is halting the Solidigm IPO, the dual-listing controversy may not be fully extinguished, given the tangled affiliate ownership of NPS and the possibility of a future NPS listing. Has the fire really gone out? SK hynix announced Friday it is suspending its pre-IPO fundraising and initial public offering review for Solidigm, saying it needs to reassess whether a listing is the most advantageous path for the company and its existing shareholders given current capital market conditions and recent share price trends. Yet calling this a clean abandonment of a dual listing would be premature. The ownership structure SK Group has put in place leaves the question very much open. Affiliate cross-investment — illegal at home, tangled abroad Earlier this year, SK hynix decided to transform its US subsidiary SK hynix NAND Product Solutions (NPS) into an AI investment and solutions company. The existing NAND flash and SSD sales and research and development operations that NPS had been running were transferred to a newly created entity, Solidigm Inc. The assets, liabilities, contracts, rights and personnel transferred in March were valued at 15.37 trillion won ($11.6 billion) — approximately 10.65 billion dollars at the exchange rate prevailing at the time (1,442.8 won per dollar). NPS received 1.65 billion newly issued Solidigm shares in return. The 15.37 trillion won figure is the business transfer price. It cannot be equated directly with the enterprise value of Solidigm or NPS, but it is far from meaningless — because immediately after the business was moved over, SK Group affiliates, not SK hynix itself, subscribed to newly issued NPS shares. As recently as the end of March, SK hynix held 100 percent of NPS. By the end of the first half, that stake had fallen to 98.16 percent, as SK and SK Innovation entered as new shareholders. SK Telecom subsequently acquired additional NPS shares, and SK Innovation made a further capital contribution. SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom are all SK Group affiliates, but they occupy very different positions in SK hynix's direct ownership chain. SK hynix's largest shareholder is SK Square, a subsidiary of SK. SK Innovation and SK Telecom are also subsidiaries of SK — making the arrangement look rather like a grandfather and an uncle moving into a house that had belonged to a father and his child. What SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom acquired was not Solidigm stock but newly issued NPS shares. One of NPS's most important assets is its stake in Solidigm. Becoming an NPS shareholder means participating indirectly in any future appreciation of Solidigm's value. A structure has now been created in which a portion of the Solidigm value that would originally have accrued entirely to SK hynix shareholders can instead flow — via NPS — to shareholders of other listed affiliates. Did they know about the NAND windfall in advance? — value surged right after purchase SK hynix committed to investing up to $10 billion in NPS through 2030 via a capital call arrangement, under which funds are drawn down as investment opportunities arise. Separately, the boards of SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom approved commitments of $250 million, $380 million and $480 million, respectively — a combined pledge of $1.11 billion from those three companies alone. The prices at which SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom acquired their NPS shares deserve close scrutiny. SK committed $250 million and had paid in $133.89 million by the end of the first half. In May it acquired 1,295 newly issued NPS shares for approximately 199.7 billion won — about 154.21 million won per share. Back-calculating from the number of shares then outstanding, the implied total equity value of NPS was approximately 15.7 trillion won. SK Innovation committed $380 million. It paid in $59.97 million in the first half, with second-quarter investment of approximately 92.4 billion won. On July 23 it made an additional capital contribution of $143.4 million through a US subsidiary, bringing the disclosed total to $203.37 million. The number of shares acquired and the per-share price from that additional contribution cannot be confirmed from publicly available disclosures alone. SK Telecom committed a total of $480 million for up to 1,198 shares. In the first capital call it acquired 642 shares for 397.13 billion won — approximately 618.58 million won per share, roughly four times the per-share price paid by SK. There was a gap of roughly two months between SK's first contribution and SK Telecom's. In that interval, the earnings outlook for the NAND business shifted dramatically. SK hynix's quarterly report shows that NPS and its subsidiaries posted first-quarter NAND sales of 3.78 trillion won and net profit of 1.27 trillion won. A year earlier, sales had been 1.42 trillion won and net profit 136.7 billion won. The quarterly report containing those figures was filed on May 15. SK's acquisition of NPS shares came after that date. SK Telecom's investment also preceded the filing of the semi-annual report on Aug. 13. Based on publicly available disclosures alone, the transactions were conducted at different prices after first-quarter results had already been made public. The Solidigm figures disclosed in SK hynix's semi-annual report — filed after SK Telecom's investment — were even more striking: first-half sales of 12.25 trillion won and net profit of 5.84 trillion won. The explosive earnings growth prompted market speculation that Solidigm's IPO valuation could range from a minimum of $100 billion to as much as $150 billion. Applying SK Telecom's per-share price of approximately 618.58 million won — the most recent publicly disclosed transaction price — the 1,875 NPS shares held by SK and SK Innovation at the end of the first half would be worth approximately 1.16 trillion won. The two companies paid approximately 292.1 billion won to acquire those shares. Using SK Telecom's actual transaction price as the benchmark, the value of their combined stake exceeds their acquisition cost by approximately 867.7 billion won. How many shares SK Innovation acquired in its July 23 additional contribution, and at what price, still needs to be confirmed. If not Solidigm — could the parent NPS list instead? NPS is Solidigm's controlling shareholder, holding a 96.86 percent stake at the end of the first half. If Solidigm's value continues to rise on the back of strong earnings, NPS's own value will inevitably track it closely — and the future value available to NPS's outside shareholders, namely the SK Group affiliates, will grow accordingly. The suspension of the Solidigm IPO review does nothing to change that structure. Solidigm generates substantial earnings. Its full-year net profit could well exceed 12 trillion won. New production facilities are not built by spending all the money at once; with its own cash flow and borrowing capacity, Solidigm has considerable ability to fund a significant portion of its capital expenditure needs internally. NPS, by contrast, currently has no core operating business that generates large-scale cash directly. The NAND and SSD operations — its former engine — have been moved down to Solidigm. NPS's new role is to invest in AI companies and develop related solutions businesses. As an investment company, NPS must generate fresh capital to reinvest through exits, dividends or profits from its own operations. Receiving dividends from Solidigm or monetizing part of its stake would provide an important source of investment funding. But Solidigm also needs capital. Even as SK hynix suspended the Solidigm listing review, it said the need to invest in new US production facilities to meet growing AI memory chip demand remains unchanged. If Solidigm embarks on large-scale US investment, its capacity to pay dividends up to NPS will be correspondingly reduced. In that scenario, NPS's primary sources of investment capital for now are likely to be affiliate contributions and returns from its own investments. Current commitments to NPS total up to $11.11 billion — up to $10 billion from SK hynix and $1.11 billion combined from SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom. Measured against the scale of AI ecosystem investment today, that sum is large in some respects and modest in others. But what if NPS needs more money for its investments? SK hynix and the affiliates could inject additional funds. NPS could borrow. It could bring in outside investors. In that process, it could sell part of its Solidigm stake. The greater the need for external capital, the stronger the case for revisiting a listing. That could mean reviving the Solidigm IPO — or it could mean NPS itself pursuing a listing. If NPS were to list under the current structure, investors would in effect be buying exposure to Solidigm's value alongside NPS's AI investment assets. Whatever the legal entity's name, SK hynix shareholders would face a dual-listing controversy returning in a different form. Moreover, outside shareholders are already inside NPS. They too will eventually need a mechanism to monetize their investment or establish a market price for it. Severing the link between NPS and Solidigm is the only way to put the dual-listing debate fully to rest. NAND back under SK hynix's roof — a reversal is needed The review of a Solidigm listing has been suspended, but the capital structure that could make a listing necessary again has not gone away. SK hynix's announcement suspending the Solidigm listing review is worth reading carefully in that context. The company was explicit that it is halting the ongoing pre-IPO and IPO review work — meaning the listing process currently under way is being set aside. But it is difficult to read that as permanently closing the door on a future listing. The company said it had decided not to pursue a listing "at this time," adding that Solidigm's growth potential and investment needs had not changed and that it would continue to review the timing, scale and financing methods for investment. In other words, the current listing review has been suspended — but the listing option itself has not been permanently retired. Protecting SK hynix shareholders' rightful share of the enterprise value of NPS and Solidigm — and of the NAND business that underpins it — requires normalizing the ownership structure. For NPS to be recognized as a genuine AI investment platform rather than a stepping stone to a dual listing, SK hynix needs to restore a structure in which it directly controls Solidigm. That is easier said than done, now that outside shareholders have already taken positions in NPS. Unwinding their stakes would be impossible to do without acknowledging Solidigm's sharply higher value. From SK hynix shareholders' perspective, the company would be buying back at a premium economic interests it had previously distributed at a lower price. From the perspective of shareholders in SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom, selling appreciated stakes cheaply is equally untenable. Yet if this dilemma goes unsolved, it is hard to say the dual-listing ember has truly been extinguished. If SK Group does not resolve it, the market will keep asking whether the intent to pursue a dual listing remains very much alive. For now, the immediate question is whether SK, SK Innovation and SK Telecom will continue to honor their capital commitments to NPS. If the plan is to unwind the Solidigm ownership structure, there is no reason to keep putting more money in.
Oct. 24, 2026
-
What the Nobel Prize in Economics tells us about the Fed's next move
Key takeaways: - This year's Nobel laureates in economics reaffirmed that macroeconomic analysis must begin not from the top down but from the actual behavior of households and businesses. - When an economic slowdown and a supply shock occur simultaneously, premature demand stimulus can fuel inflation. Once price stability breaks down, economic stability becomes equally elusive. - A central bank's role extends beyond setting interest rates. Accurately reading economic conditions on the ground and communicating future policy direction in a way that markets and economic actors can trust are themselves part of monetary policy. - Ultimately, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh's success or failure will hinge on how well he reads the real economy and how effectively he communicates with markets. The winners of the 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics have been announced: Robert E. Hall, professor emeritus at Stanford University, and Michael Woodford, professor at Columbia University. The two scholars laid the theoretical groundwork that led us to pay attention not only to interest rate decisions by the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world, but also to the expected path of future rates and the messages those institutions send. Their research is already being applied directly to central bank policymaking. It is quite significant that their work has been recognized with the Nobel Prize at a moment when inflation and supply chain disruptions have thrust the role of central banks back into the spotlight. Examining their contributions also offers considerable help in anticipating where central banks are headed. Their insights can be distilled into two questions and their answers. Will benchmark interest rates rise further? Is Fed Chair Kevin Warsh doing a good job? The limits of Keynesianism — too far removed from the real economy Traditional Keynesian models assumed that the statistical relationships among major macroeconomic variables — inflation, unemployment, consumption and output — were relatively stable and broadly linear. The Phillips curve, which holds that inflation tends to fall when unemployment is high and rise when unemployment is low, is the classic example. The assumption that household consumption rises when disposable income increases follows the same logic. Then came the oil shocks of the 1970s, when unemployment rose even as inflation climbed. The relationship between income and consumption also proved far less stable than the models had assumed. Overstimulating demand in response to the slowdown and rising unemployment made inflation worse, leaving years of low growth and high prices as a lasting legacy. Robert E. Lucas Jr., who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1995, identified the limits of this approach. Inflation is shaped by the pricing decisions of countless individual firms. Private consumption flows from the decisions of countless households. Output is determined by the choices of individual companies and workers. Lucas argued that macroeconomic phenomena can only be properly understood by studying the behavior of individual economic actors and aggregating those findings. People respond to information — a shift in thinking Robert E. Hall is among the most prominent researchers to have given concrete form to the "microfoundations" Lucas demanded, doing so in the realm of consumption. Hall argued that what matters for changes in household consumption is not information that has already been anticipated, but unexpected new information. If a salary increase next year is already certain, people can factor that into their spending plans now rather than waiting until next year arrives. Only when new information arrives that changes their view of the future will their consumption plans shift. Woodford brought this forward-looking consumer into macroeconomic models. The key variable in that framework is the interest rate — not the current rate alone, but the expected path of real interest rates going forward. When rates are expected to stay high, saving becomes more attractive than current spending; when the opposite holds, current consumption rises. A central bank can move today's consumption and investment by adjusting the current rate while simultaneously shaping expectations about future rates. The same forward-looking logic applies to corporate pricing decisions. Firms set their current prices based on expectations about how competitors' prices and their own costs will evolve. Ultimately, what people believe about how a central bank will respond to future inflation and interest rates also influences prices today. That is why Woodford placed such weight on central bank credibility, transparency and policy communication. The New Keynesian model that emerged from Hall and Woodford's research can prescribe a different course of action from simple demand stimulus when the economy faces a supply shock — a sudden surge in energy prices, a disruption to global supply chains, or any other event that abruptly affects the economy's productive potential. The prescription is to accept a near-term growth slowdown and align demand with reduced supply capacity in order to prevent inflation from getting out of control. Cutting rates to stimulate demand when the economy is weak risks channeling more demand into a supply-constrained economy, which can make inflation worse rather than better. Question 1: Will rates rise further? Probably. Now for the answers. On interest rates: US economic data show that consumption remains solid. Real personal consumption expenditures rose 0.6 percent month on month in August, PCE inflation was up 3.4 percent year on year, and core PCE climbed 3.0 percent. Enormous capital demand driven by AI investment, some supply bottlenecks, and energy supply shocks stemming from ongoing conflicts continue to weigh on the economy. Applying the Hall-Woodford framework to the current US economy, there is at least no case for rushing to cut rates. If anything, the case for a further hike could be made. The minutes of the September FOMC meeting, at which the benchmark interest rate was raised, show that Fed participants flagged the possibility that AI investment could push aggregate demand above aggregate supply, along with energy shocks and still-elevated inflation. Some participants actually raised their estimates of the neutral rate. Several judged that the current benchmark rate of 3.75 to 4.00 percent was "not restrictive, or only slightly restrictive." What matters here is not the number itself — the fact that the benchmark rate is close to 4 percent. What matters is how far the current rate actually stands above the neutral rate. If AI investment, productivity gains and large-scale fiscal demand have pushed the economy's neutral rate higher, then 4 percent — once considered comfortably high — may not represent as strong a tightening stance as it once did. Chair Warsh voted in favor of the September rate hike, showing a hawkish streak that ran counter to the expectations — or perhaps hopes — of President Donald Trump, who appointed him. Markets also widely expect the Fed to raise rates again in December, even if doing so at the October meeting, just before the midterm elections, would be difficult. Question 2: Is Warsh doing a good job? He needs to be. Since taking office, Warsh has consistently expressed skepticism about forward guidance, arguing that it can distort price discovery by making markets focus on the Fed rather than on the economy itself. Warsh's logic has merit. If the Fed spells out its future rate path too helpfully, markets end up watching the Fed's every word rather than processing real information coming from the economy. The Fed then looks at the market prices shaped by that dynamic to inform its own policy judgments — what Warsh calls a kind of "hall of mirrors." But the risks on the other side are equally serious. If economic actors cannot get adequate information about the central bank's policy direction and uncertainty about inflation and interest rates grows, consumption and investment can contract. Greater uncertainty about the rate path also raises the risk premium investors demand. As a result, market interest rates can climb even without the central bank raising its benchmark rate. Ultimately, Warsh's experiment is a challenge to the tradition of "expectations management" that modern central banks have built since Woodford. Is Warsh right to warn against the excesses of forward guidance? Or does Woodford's insight — that central banks must offer credible policy direction to reduce uncertainty — still matter more? Warsh is making rate decisions that broadly resemble the Woodford prescription, while simultaneously challenging the post-Woodford tradition in the way he communicates policy. US long-term Treasury yields top 5% — warning or opportunity? The hottest issue in financial markets right now is elevated long-term interest rates — the product of a complex interplay of high oil prices, the US fiscal deficit and government bond supply, large-scale bond issuance by AI companies, and mortgage-related hedging activity. Monetary policy primarily feeds through to short-term rates directly, but market perceptions of inflation and the central bank's response also reach all the way to long-term rates. If the Fed demonstrates sufficient resolve to tighten, bringing down inflation expectations and cooling an overheating economy, that becomes a factor pulling long-term rates lower over the medium to long term. If markets instead judge the Fed's response to be inadequate, inflation expectations and risk premiums can keep long-term rates elevated. What matters most is the state of the economy when the Fed meets in December. As long-term rates have risen, wariness about AI investment and the semiconductor boom has also grown. With the yield on the 10-year US Treasury note surpassing 5 percent, the case for avoiding risk assets has strengthened considerably. If AI investment cools and the appeal of beaten-down bond prices comes to the fore, both the economy and share prices could turn down simultaneously. Should long-term rates fall on the back of weaker AI investment, falling share prices and growth concerns, the Fed's justification for further tightening would also weaken. But inflation has not gone away. What happens if energy supply shocks originating from Iran and Russia continue to push prices higher? Returning to the Hall-Woodford framework, the Fed's response in that scenario could well be further tightening despite an economic slowdown. If the Democratic Party wins a majority in the House in the US midterm elections, it could put the brakes on additional fiscal expansion by the Donald Trump administration. That would be a factor reducing government bond supply and long-term rates, but it would be a negative for the economy. In the end, the battle that will determine the direction of US interest rates is relatively clear. On one side stand a weakening economy and softening employment. On the other stand elevated inflation, supply shocks and a neutral rate that may have moved higher. If the former prevails, rates will fall. If the latter wins out, today's high rates will persist longer — or rise further. The balance of evidence so far makes it hard to dismiss the latter. An economy that needs high rates, shaken by the very rates it needs Applying the work of this year's Nobel laureates to the current US economy yields a paradoxical conclusion. The problem with the US economy may not be that rates are too high. The problem may be that demand and inflation are strong enough to require rates that high. But once those high rates begin to rattle AI investment and asset prices — stocks, bonds and the rest — the picture changes. If the Fed tightens aggressively, the economy and asset prices will suffer. If it moves slowly, inflation and long-term rates will not come down easily. An economy that needs high rates may ultimately be destabilized by the very rates it requires. That is probably the single most important thing markets should be watching between now and the December FOMC meeting. Korea faces a rougher road, with volatility already running high For the Korean stock market, where share price and exchange rate volatility are already unusually high, the pressure is even greater. Elevated US interest rates and long-term yields can heighten risk aversion and affect the flow of foreign capital. The won's recent strength — driven in part by export growth in semiconductors — despite a stronger dollar is itself a double-edged development. For foreign investors already holding Korean equities, a stronger won creates an incentive to realize currency gains. All else being equal, won appreciation also reduces the won-denominated sales and profits of export-oriented companies. Moreover, the semiconductors and AI sectors that have led the Korean market recently are precisely the large-scale investment industries most sensitive to high interest rates and long-term yields. A rate problem that starts in the United States can transmit simultaneously to share prices, the exchange rate and corporate investment in Korea. The external environment is daunting. The Korean stock market, which ranked among the world's best performers in the first half of the year before tumbling to near the bottom globally in the second half, has limited defenses it can build on its own — and ultimately those defenses come down to corporate value. We cannot change external interest rates. What Korean companies can do themselves is raise shareholder returns and capital efficiency, building the kind of corporate value that can withstand high rates. In the Joseon Dynasty, there was a practice known as "gwanpung" — observing the customs of the people. Officials would read the popular songs and poems of ordinary life to gauge the successes and failures of governance and the state of the world. Even the title "gwanchalsa," the highest provincial official overseeing a region, is connected to this tradition of gwanpung. In that tradition, poetry was not mere literature. It was the song of the people, carrying within it joy and sorrow, anger and longing, and the texture of daily life. The gains and losses of politics, the light and shadow of society, naturally surfaced in the songs of ordinary people. That is why those in power gathered the songs of the common folk to read the world. The tradition is far older than Joseon. The "Treatise on Food and Money" in the Book of Han records that in spring, officials would travel the roads collecting poems to present to the grand historian, who would then recite them to the Son of Heaven. "The king knows all under heaven without peering through his window." — Classic of Poetry The "Treatise on Arts and Literature" in the same work makes the purpose even clearer: "In ancient times there were officials who collected poetry. Through it, the king observed the customs of the people, learned of successes and failures, and corrected himself." Going back further still, the "Royal Regulations" chapter of the Book of Rites records that when the Son of Heaven made his royal tours, he would have the grand historian "present the poems to observe the customs of the people." The 160 poems of the Guofeng section of the Classic of Poetry are the most celebrated legacy of this idea, gathering songs from 15 different regions. The underlying conviction was that to know all under heaven from within the palace walls, one must first attend to the circumstances of each individual beyond them. What Hall and Woodford did in modern macroeconomics is ultimately the same bottom-up approach. They read the macro by aggregating the micro — the behavior of individual households and firms that determine consumption, prices and output. It is worth applying the same thinking to asset management. Rather than staring only at sweeping economic indicators, one must read what people are buying, where companies are putting their money, and what new information markets are reacting to. The world moves first in the daily lives of people; macroeconomic indicators and policy follow behind.
Oct. 14, 2026
-
Herald Exclusive: Korea Customs Service Commissioner Lee Jong-wook
- Fighting trade-based financial crime hidden behind the numbers of trade In 2013, a company marked its 10th anniversary by crossing 1 trillion won ($749 million) in annual sales, with 80 percent of that revenue coming from overseas. A customs investigation the following year told a very different story. The company had been filing export declarations for home appliances that had never actually changed hands, listing prices of several million won per unit, then using the fabricated export documents to obtain more than 3 trillion won in fraudulent loans from commercial banks. Of that amount, roughly 540 billion won was never repaid — a burden that fell on the financial sector and the public, leaving a lasting stain on South Korea's economic history. The scandal is known today as the Monuel incident. In its wake, Korea Customs Service, the Korea Federation of Banks, and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE) worked closely together to prevent a repeat. They built a framework for sharing customs export-import data with bank loan-screening systems and achieved early detection of anomalies in trade receivables to block fraudulent lending. The Monuel case is a textbook example of trade-based financial crime (TBFC) — the exploitation of trade to defraud public finances or destabilize financial markets. More recently, such crimes have spread well beyond bank lending into capital markets, government subsidies, public procurement, and national health insurance funds. Recent customs enforcement cases illustrate the severity of the problem. One company was caught repeatedly importing and exporting cheap telecommunications components at inflated prices to manufacture a track record of strong sales, then exploiting that record to secure a stock market listing while also fraudulently collecting government subsidies. In another case, a supplier imported inexpensive Chinese fire-department lanterns, stripped off the country-of-origin labels, and passed the products off as domestically made before delivering them to fire stations nationwide. A separate company inflated the declared import prices of adult walkers — a category covered by long-term care benefits — to pocket excess reimbursements, adding to the financial burden on vulnerable members of society. Detecting these crimes accurately requires cross-referencing Korea Customs Service's export-import and foreign-exchange data against information held by the agencies that administer the relevant programs and systems. Those agencies have records on the companies they screen and support, but they face practical limits in independently verifying whether a company's declared export-import figures, transaction prices, and country of origin match actual trade activity. Korea Customs Service can analyze export-import and foreign-exchange transaction data to examine the substance of trade — real performance figures, prices, and counterparties — but it has limited visibility into which government support programs or public procurement contracts a given company may be involved in. What is needed, ultimately, is a collaborative framework in which each agency connects the information it holds to compensate for the blind spots of the others. That is precisely why Korea Customs Service launched a special TBFC investigation unit at Seoul Customs in early September. Under the arrangement, agencies including the Ministry of SMEs and Startups, the Public Procurement Service, and Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (KoFIU) supply company and transaction data to Korea Customs Service, which integrates it with export-import and foreign-exchange records for use in foreign-exchange inspections and investigations. The findings are passed back to the relevant agencies, which then impose necessary sanctions — recovering subsidies and restricting bidding rights — and close the regulatory gaps that allowed the abuse. In this way, the TBFC unit is dismantling the information silos between agencies and building an integrated, joint monitoring and enforcement system that spans data sharing, analysis, investigation, sanctions, and regulatory reform. At the center of the analytical work sits the TBFC Information Analysis Center, which operates under the special unit. The center consolidates information shared by partner agencies — covering capital markets, public procurement, government subsidy programs, and policy finance — and combines it with Korea Customs Service's own export-import and foreign-exchange data to identify suspect companies. Investigation and enforcement teams then act on those findings, opening criminal investigations or conducting foreign-exchange inspections depending on the nature of each case. Korea Customs Service is also considering signing MOUs with partner agencies to expand the network of collaborators and further develop the integrated joint monitoring and enforcement framework. The figures on trade documents serve as the basis for valuing companies, determining eligibility for government support and policy financing, and shaping investor decisions. When those figures are manipulated, the damage falls on honest businesses and investors, and public finances spring a leak. Korea Customs Service is committed to accurately identifying manipulation of performance records, prices, and country of origin hidden within export-import transactions, and to ensuring that its findings lead all the way through to recovery, sanctions, and regulatory reform. We will fulfill our responsibilities at the economic border so that the benefits of public policy flow in full to the citizens and businesses that genuinely deserve them.
Oct. 13, 2026
-
[Biz Insight] Put industrial ecosystem strategy first, and competitive advantage follows
The prevailing view of global competition remains largely company-centric. As businesses go multinational, they often overlook the fact that they are forming part of a single, large-scale ecosystem. It is worth internalizing the idea that companies do not compete as isolated entities but through the ecosystems they help build within their industries. That shift in perspective drives changes in thinking and, ultimately, in behavior. Managing a global company now demands an "ecosystem strategy." The industrial ecosystem a company belongs to spans multiple supply chains — from materials and components to finished-product manufacturing, logistics and sales. Optimizing processes across the entire supply chain is what creates competitiveness. When that optimization effort pays off, competitive advantage is secured, and over time an insurmountable gap opens up — what some call an "ultra-gap." Irreplaceability follows. This reveals that technological superiority alone does not produce such a gap. The supply chains within the ecosystem must, however, remain unobstructed. From raw materials and components through final assembly and sales, supply chains anchored by a handful of large companies depend on a wide network of partners. A tightly linked chain forms around the shared value of mutual benefit. Even when large companies pursue vertical integration and in-house strategies, the need for partner firms does not disappear. The law of nature — that an ecosystem collapses when it loses its health — applies equally here. A robust ecosystem mindset and strong bonds are essential. Maintaining those bonds and fostering cooperative partnerships to prevent supply chain disruptions become critical in this environment. With the international trading order in turmoil, supply chain instability is a constant risk. No company can afford to feel secure simply because its own operations are running smoothly. At the heart of cooperative partnership is not the supply of products but the supply and exchange of value — value that encompasses not only money but intangible elements such as closeness, trust and support. Over time, these ties harden into a more resilient relational structure. Yet the nature of such networks is fragile, and mutual consideration is indispensable. If a large company ignores the difficulties of its partners rather than sharing in them, the supply chain and the broader ecosystem can collapse in an instant. The reverse is equally true. Recently, a major semiconductor company announced it would cover up to 50 percent of the early-stage research and development costs that partner firms incur on high-risk projects, reimbursing those costs after the fact regardless of whether the projects succeed or fail. The move drew attention as a concrete step toward strengthening bonds between large companies and their suppliers. Jung Woon-chan, chairman of the Shared Growth Institute, said co-prosperity and shared growth represent "the highest-level management strategy for maximizing corporate value," adding that they "can serve as the means to sustain a robust industrial ecosystem that no one can challenge."
Oct. 13, 2026
-
Solidigm IPO: Who really benefits — and at whose expense?
① Solidigm does not urgently need a large capital infusion — yet certain parties stand to gain enormously from a listing. ② Transactions barred among SK affiliates in Korea face no such restrictions at Solidigm, a US-incorporated entity. ③ The more "they" profit from the Solidigm IPO, the less is left for the true owners: SK hynix shareholders. ④ A price return swap (PRS) structure was used to sell the SK Group stake of Chairman Chey Tae-won, who faces a court-ordered asset division. ⑤ For Solidigm to keep outperforming, SK hynix may have to keep making concessions — or sacrifices. SK Group investors are facing a complex equation. The variables — Solidigm's planned initial public offering and Chairman Chey Tae-won's divorce litigation — may seem unrelated at first glance, but they are intertwined. Many of the variables remain unknown. Plugging in the values one by one reveals a structure that may not be particularly welcome news for ordinary shareholders of SK hynix, widely regarded as a "people's stock." Bloomberg reported Thursday that Solidigm, a subsidiary two levels below SK hynix, has selected Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as underwriters for its IPO. The listing is most likely to take place in 2027, with an estimated valuation of $100 billion and potential proceeds of around $10 billion. The underwriters are also said to be pursuing a pre-IPO round with two investors that could raise up to $7.2 billion. Does Solidigm really need $17 billion from outside investors? Does Solidigm truly need to raise as much as $17.2 billion in external capital? Reuters has reported that Solidigm is exploring its first NAND production base on the US East Coast, with New York state mentioned as a candidate. The required investment would vary widely depending on the type of facility. A back-end plant for SSD assembly and testing could be built for a few billion dollars, but a front-end fab for wafer production could easily exceed $10 billion in its first phase alone. SK hynix's interim financial statements as of late June show that NPS (SK hynix NAND Product Solutions Corp. and its subsidiaries), which includes Solidigm, posted net assets of 8.23 trillion won ($6.14 billion) and first-half net profit of 5.84 trillion won. In the same period last year, those figures were 2.27 trillion won and 132.1 billion won, respectively. A rough estimate based on the performance trends of rivals Kioxia and SanDisk suggests Solidigm's full-year net profit this year could reach 14 trillion to 16 trillion won, with some projections pointing to more than 20 trillion won in 2027. Assuming current industry conditions hold to some degree, cumulative earnings from the second half of this year through 2029 could reach $30 billion to $40 billion. Even if conditions deteriorate sharply from 2028 and profits fall by half, the accumulated earnings would still be substantial. Add depreciation, and operating cash flow would exceed net profit. Building a large-scale front-end fab in the United States would require enormous capital — but whether that money truly needs to come from outside investors is a question worth examining. The chairman's divorce and a 944 billion won asset division Chey Tae-won recently agreed to sell 944 billion won worth of his personal stake in SK Inc. — the same amount set by a court in the retrial of his divorce case against Noh So-young, director of Art Center Nabi. As a sale by a major shareholder, the transaction carries capital gains tax based on the acquisition cost, plus transaction fees. The exact tax liability depends on the original cost basis, but estimates put it at close to 700 billion won. Chey's side decided not to contest the 700 billion won portion of the 944 billion won total during the re-appeal process, seeking a Supreme Court ruling only on the remaining 244 billion won. In effect, he must secure at least 700 billion won to fund the asset division. What has drawn attention is the price return swap (PRS) contract he entered into with Korea Investment & Securities as part of the sale. TRS was the old favorite — now it's PRS? Chey's stake in SK Inc. is directly tied to his control over the group. Under the arrangement, he transfers shares worth about 400 billion won to Korea Investment & Securities, with the two sides settling the difference between the disposal price and a reference price three years later. If the share price rises, Chey keeps the gain; if it falls, he absorbs the loss. Ownership and voting rights pass to Korea Investment & Securities, but much of the price risk and upside remain with Chey. In economic substance it resembles a loan more than a sale — he secures immediate cash while retaining exposure to any appreciation in SK Inc.'s share price over three years. Although not disclosed publicly, the structure could also include a call option or right of first refusal allowing Chey to buy back the transferred stake at the contract's expiry. That would let him reclaim the shares at the original sale price even if the stock has risen. SK Group has previously used derivatives such as total return swaps (TRS) and call options in stake transactions involving SK E&S and SK Siltron, bringing in outside capital while preserving a path to reclaim the shares. The terms of the deal with the strategic investor that acquired 544 billion won worth of shares are therefore another variable — the possibility that Chey has built in an option to repurchase that stake cannot be ruled out at this stage. Chey holds a 29.3 percent stake in SK Siltron through a TRS arrangement. Selling it could net him hundreds of billions of won — but still not enough to buy back the SK Inc. shares he has just sold. Solidigm's valuation soars — as SK affiliates pile in Solidigm is currently a wholly owned subsidiary of NPS. SK Inc., which Chey directly controls, invested about 199.7 billion won in NPS in May. Back-calculating from the investment amount and the stake acquired implies an NPS valuation of roughly $10.5 billion at the time. SK Innovation also invested 89.5 billion won during the first half at a similar valuation. SK Telecom then invested 397.1 billion won in late July, implying a valuation of roughly $41 billion — nearly a tenfold increase in just a few months. The stakes these affiliates purchased were newly issued shares from NPS. Selling new shares at a discount — if that is indeed what happened — could mean SK hynix, as NPS's largest shareholder, got the short end of the deal. Under Korea's Fair Trade Act, SK Inc. as a holding company, and "uncle" companies SK Innovation and SK Telecom, are barred from investing in SK hynix domestically. Because NPS is a foreign entity, domestic regulations do not apply. The three companies plan to invest a combined total of $1.1 billion in NPS. Former SK hynix executives investing in Solidigm ahead of the IPO? The private equity fund said to be investing around 2 trillion won in Solidigm's pre-IPO round is TechBridge Investment. Some domestic media outlets have recently reported that former SK hynix executives — including former President Noh Jong-won, former Executive Vice President Hyun Eun-ah and former Executive Vice President Lee Jae-seo — are involved with TechBridge Investment. These are individuals who played central roles in Solidigm's creation and the acquisition of Intel's NAND business. How executives who only recently left SK hynix managed to raise capital in the trillion-won range is an open question — as is the identity of the limited partners who entrusted them with that money. US private equity funds are generally under no obligation to disclose their individual LP lists to the public, making it difficult to trace the source of the funds. Bloomberg put Solidigm's expected valuation at $100 billion — a discount of more than 20 percent to SanDisk — while Reuters recently cited a projection of $150 billion, on par with SanDisk. Solidigm signed a deal with CoreWeave on Aug. 7 giving it priority allocation of enterprise SSD production capacity, and on Wednesday announced an extended SSD partnership with Broadcom along with the addition of a contract manufacturing base in Taiwan. Both developments are the kind of news that could push the valuation higher. For pre-IPO investors, the listing is the clearest opportunity to realize gains. If the pre-IPO and IPO follow in quick succession within a year, early investors benefit most when the valuation rises as sharply as possible in a short period. Does Solidigm's valuation depend on SK hynix? That is especially true when the NAND market is booming, as it is now. Solidigm sources NAND wafers from SK hynix to manufacture enterprise SSDs. The lower the wafer price, the lower Solidigm's costs and the higher its profits — but the greater the burden on SK hynix. How SK hynix prices those wafers directly affects Solidigm's valuation. Arm's-length pricing rules and transfer pricing regulations exist for related-party transactions, but applying them to overseas entities is difficult in practice. Solidigm would not be the first large conglomerate subsidiary to list overseas. Hyundai Motor and LG Electronics have set precedents. Hyundai Motor held 100 percent of its India unit right up to the IPO and issued no new shares at listing. Instead, it sold a 17.5 percent existing stake through an offer for sale, with proceeds of roughly 3 trillion won flowing back to Hyundai Motor's parent. Hyundai Motor's stake fell from 100 percent to 82.5 percent, but not a single won of the public offering proceeds went into the India unit itself. The stated rationale for the listing was to build a local funding structure — while returning the fruits of years of growth to the parent company's shareholders. LG Electronics followed a similar approach with its India unit. In an IPO aimed at expanding local investment, LG Electronics sold 15 percent of its 100 percent stake as an existing-share offering. Proceeds of roughly 1.7 trillion won accrued to LG Electronics' parent. LG Group's holding company, LG Corp., did not purchase any shares in LG Electronics' India unit. "A person cannot draw a square with the left hand while simultaneously drawing a circle with the right." — Han Feizi, "Outer Congeries of Sayings, Lower Left Series" On Oct. 1, SK hynix said of the Solidigm situation: "Whether to use external or internal capital is a matter that must be judged by comprehensively considering not only the form but also the economic value impact on existing shareholders," adding that it would "review the impact on existing shareholders and the necessary shareholder protection measures, and provide a thorough explanation." Whether SK can draw a square with one hand and a circle with the other remains to be seen.
Oct. 9, 2026
-
Hangul Day, literacy and the call to act
Hangul Day is, at its core, a day for the written script — but we have come to think of it more broadly as a day for language itself. Calls to use proper Korean and to be mindful of foreign-language borrowings are all extensions of that linguistic concern. In that sense, Hangul Day has become Korean Language Day: a moment to reflect deeply on both our script and our speech. Yet, as is often noted, Hangul Day is only Hangul Day — one day a year — and that is precisely why meaningful change is so hard to sustain. Because Hangul Day centers on the script, there is a tendency to treat the use of hanja as something close to a transgression, and that attitude has been growing stronger of late. Some people see a hanja sign on a storefront and immediately think of China — even though the Chinese characters used in China differ from those used in Korea. People bristle at hanja yet shrug at the Latin alphabet, which lines every street and fills every television screen. Hangul Day is a day for hangul, and the question of the Latin alphabet deserves the same honest scrutiny we apply to hanja. Even King Sejong, who created hangul, almost certainly never intended to abolish hanja entirely. I am not calling for a ban on the Latin alphabet either. The point is that both hanja and the alphabet deserve thoughtful, deliberate use. Every Hangul Day, the media is flooded with stories about literacy. Children's reading comprehension is mocked with extreme anecdotes, and smartphones, video games and a lack of reading are blamed for the supposed decline. The argument that children no longer learn hanja is never far behind. Opinions on hanja education tend to be sharply divided. But would teaching hanja actually improve literacy? Even those who make that claim often seem to conflate literacy with vocabulary. It is true that a large share of Korean vocabulary has Chinese-character roots, but in most cases the problem is not ignorance of hanja — it is simply that people have not studied the words themselves. After all, how many people who invoke the word "vocabulary" could explain what its hanja characters actually mean? Adults who worry about children's literacy often give me pause. They fret about children's smartphone use, yet adult smartphone habits are hardly better. They worry about children playing video games, yet many adults spend entire days absorbed in YouTube. Most troubling are the adults who complain that young people do not read — because South Korea's adult reading rate is nothing short of embarrassing. A 2025 survey on adult reading found that six in 10 adults had not read a single book in the past year. These same people, who never pick up a book themselves, are anxious about whether children are reading enough. In reality, young people read far more than adults do. The single most effective way to encourage a child to read is to model the habit yourself. How many books have you read this year? The debate over whether to teach hanja raises one more critical question: are there enough people qualified to teach it? Many of those who advocate for hanja education do not actually know much hanja themselves — not difficult characters, but even the basics. University textbooks from several decades ago were filled with hanja; most of those books are now effectively obsolete because so few people can read them. Some academic journals still require hanja, but citation rates drop when hanja appears heavily, simply because readers cannot engage with what they cannot read. Even setting aside the question of universal hanja education, I do worry seriously about the dwindling number of specialists in classical Chinese writing. Who will be left to read and understand the works our own scholars wrote in the past? It is undeniable that hangul has enriched our linguistic lives. Without it, countless people would still be unable to read or write. Believers could not read the Bible or Buddhist scriptures. Writing a simple letter would have been a struggle. Sending or reading a text message would be unthinkable. The thought alone is sobering. The creation of hangul was a profound gift. But we must also remember the world that hangul was meant to reveal. No one should be left behind because they cannot read. A world where people are discriminated against or disadvantaged because of literacy is not a just world. And it is not only about literacy. No one should face discrimination for not knowing a foreign language, and no one should face discrimination for not knowing Korean. No one should be diminished for any reason. We must hold one another in esteem. The heart of literacy is not comprehension — it is action. If you have read something, you must live accordingly. If you have truly read about King Sejong's creation of hangul, you should be wrestling with what it means to be distinctly ourselves, and you should be dreaming of a world without discrimination. That is the world hangul was created to bring into being. By Cho Hyun-yong, professor at Kyung Hee University
Oct. 8, 2026
-
Will US long-term rates keep climbing? How the bond market called Bessent's bluff
Rising US long-term interest rates have become the defining issue in global financial markets. But why have they climbed so fast? Yields have now surpassed the expected return on stocks for the first time in 20 months — a yield gap inversion. The US fiscal deficit is nothing new, and recent inflation data came in below expectations. To understand what really drove September's rate surge, you need to look inside the bond market itself and at the mechanics of hedging. Bond yields and prices move in opposite directions. Try reading recent developments in the US Treasury market not as a "rate spike" but as a "price crash." Even bonds with fixed maturities and coupons trade at prices that shift constantly. When sell orders pile up — as in the stock market — prices fall, and those falling prices can trigger further selling. Who sold, and why? And what comes next? On Aug. 19, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a plan to buy back long-term government bonds. The move was designed to absorb selling pressure in the market. When long-term rates rise, the interest cost of issuing new Treasuries increases — so the government's intention was to support bond prices directly and stabilize yields. On Aug. 24, Stanley Druckenmiller published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled "Let the Bond Market Speak," criticizing any attempt to artificially suppress yields that reflect fiscal and economic realities. The two men once worked together at George Soros's hedge fund — and Druckenmiller is the very investor Bessent has long cited as the foremost expert in macro investing. Then, on Sept. 9, Bessent told an audience at Southern Methodist University: "I am the house now … bet against me if you want." What did he mean? Foreign governments, central banks and the Fed step back from Treasuries According to a Barclays analysis, the split between public-sector and private-sector holdings of US Treasuries was roughly 50-50 in both 2006 and 2016. By 2026, that had shifted to 73 percent private and 27 percent public. Foreign central banks and the Federal Reserve have stepped back, and their place has been taken by private capital — funds, banks and households. As the Donald Trump administration weaponized the dollar alongside its trade war, major governments pulled back from investing in long-term US Treasuries. The Fed's role has also changed. During the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Fed bought Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities on a massive scale through quantitative easing. As quantitative tightening subsequently shrank the Fed's balance sheet, private investors were left holding more bonds and more interest-rate risk. QT was halted in December last year. Even so, the Fed is reinvesting principal repayments from its MBS holdings not back into MBS but into short-term Treasuries. Fed Chair Kevin Warsh has signaled that unconventional tools like QE should be used sparingly outside of genuine crises. Bessent, who wants lower rates to reduce the government's borrowing costs, and Warsh, who is focused on keeping inflation in check, do not always see eye to eye. Skittish new investors push back against Bessent Private investors calculate more complex trade-offs. They weigh not only expected returns but also unrealized losses, funding costs and the yields available on other assets. An investor who borrowed to buy bonds may face shrinking collateral value as prices fall, forcing them to raise additional cash. Even if they believe prices will recover over time, they must first manage the immediate risk. Hedge funds are the clearest example. As long-term Treasury yields rose, hedge funds emerged as major buyers — but their goal is not to hold bonds to maturity and collect interest. They may leverage their Treasury holdings to maximize returns, exploit price differences between cash bonds and futures, or build offsetting positions to hedge against price swings. Selling Treasury futures is a standard way to reduce exposure to falling bond prices in a rising-rate environment. Because cash and futures markets are linked, these trades feed back into cash prices as well. Bessent, a former macro hedge fund manager, knows perfectly well that the shift in the Treasury investor base has increased demand for hedging in the long-end market. His warning to the market — don't bet on higher rates; move toward lower ones — was deliberate. His message was: I've gone from running a macro hedge fund to running the house, so don't play against me. Yet long-term Treasury prices fell sharply in September. As Druckenmiller had argued, the market spoke its mind without flinching. Still, hedge fund selling of Treasury futures alone could not have driven such a steep drop across the vast long-term Treasury market in September. The story changes if MBS investors — an even larger force — were moving in the same direction. Falling bond prices trigger MBS hedging, pushing rates higher still The outstanding balance of the US MBS market exceeds $12 trillion, making it the second-largest bond market after US Treasuries at roughly $32 trillion. Of that total, more than $9 trillion consists of MBS guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and by the federal agency Ginnie Mae. Because these MBS carry low credit risk, US institutional investors hold them in large quantities. Unlike Treasuries, MBS carry prepayment risk — and when long-term rates rise, MBS values fall. When rates fall, borrowers refinance, paying off higher-rate loans early and returning principal to MBS investors sooner than expected. This shortens the expected holding period — or duration — of MBS. The price change of a bond equals its duration multiplied by the change in yield: a bond with a duration of eight years, for instance, loses roughly 4 percent in price when rates rise by 50 basis points. The standard playbook is to extend duration when rates are falling and shorten it when they are rising. When long-term rates rise, the likelihood of early repayment on older, lower-rate mortgages declines, extending MBS duration. Selling long-term Treasuries or Treasury futures can shorten the overall portfolio duration. The result is a self-reinforcing loop: rising long-term rates extend MBS duration, prompting Treasury sales to hedge, which pushes rates higher still. Selling begets more selling. The very trades designed to limit individual losses end up amplifying losses across the entire market. Trend-following hedge funds deepen the move further. The Financial Times reported Friday that quantitative hedge funds using computer models to track market momentum are reaping strong profits from the global bond rout. September's rate moves offer a clear illustration of these dynamics. From Sept. 1 through Sept. 30, the nominal yield on the 10-year US Treasury rose 50 basis points (one percentage point equals 100 basis points), while the real yield on the same-maturity Treasury Inflation-Protected Security rose 49 basis points. The gap between the two — a gauge of inflation expectations — widened by just 1 basis point. The market demanded almost no additional inflation compensation; nearly all of the rate increase came from real yields. That makes it hard to explain September's sharp rise purely as a reflection of growing inflation anxiety. Selling and hedging activity aimed at limiting losses in the secondary market likely amplified the move. In short, when Bessent told the market "go ahead and try me," the market replied: "Go ahead and stop us." Yield gap inverts for first time in 20 months — Treasuries now out-yield stocks Does September's rate surge mean Bessent has lost? Not necessarily. There are early signs that the upward momentum in long-term rates may be fading. What goes up must come down. As rates rise, the room for further MBS duration extension shrinks. If prepayments have already fallen sharply, there is less scope for them to fall further even if rates climb more — which means less pressure for additional hedging sales. An analysis of Federal Housing Finance Agency first-quarter 2026 mortgage data by Realtor.com found that 77.9 percent of outstanding loans carry rates below 6 percent. The rate on a new 30-year fixed mortgage stood at 7.28 percent as of Thursday. Most borrowers who locked in low rates have no reason to refinance even if market rates rise further. This suggests the feedback loop — where rising rates trigger more hedging sales — may gradually lose force. There are also signs of change in how hyperscalers compete with Treasuries for funding. An Aviva Investors tally of bond issuance by Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle found that of the roughly $170 billion they issued through June 26 this year, more than a third was denominated in currencies other than the dollar — not just euros, but also Canadian dollars, Swiss francs, British pounds and Japanese yen. Their data centers are being built around the world, and borrowing in local currencies to fund local spending reduces foreign-exchange risk while broadening the investor base. As their funding needs spread across more currencies, the pressure they place on the dollar bond market — competing directly with US Treasuries — may ease. In fact, the absolute level of long-term yields has already moved into a range that looks quite attractive. As of Sept. 25, the 12-month forward price-to-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stood at 19.2 times, according to FactSet — implying an earnings yield of roughly 5.2 percent. The 10-year Treasury yield closed September at 5.293 percent. On a month-end basis, the expected return on bonds now exceeds that on stocks — a yield gap inversion. On Thursday (local time), the 10-year Treasury yield briefly touched around 5.34 percent intraday, its highest since 2002, before pulling back to the 5.23–5.24 percent range. A seven-session winning streak for yields also came to an end, with buyers drawn in by the higher returns on offer. The previous yield gap inversion occurred in December 2024 and January 2025. At the end of January 2025, the 10-year yield peaked at 4.58 percent before falling to 3.97 percent by February of this year. The inversion before that dates back to March 2003. The US had seen a sustained yield gap inversion from October 1998 through July 2001, during the dot-com bubble. Stocks offer the prospect of earnings growth, but also the risk of disappointment. Developments in the Middle East and oil prices remain wild cards, but the current level of the 10-year Treasury yield is high enough to make investors reconsider whether holding equities is still worth it. 'The market has spoken. Listen.' The 10-year Treasury yield ended September up 54 basis points from the end of August. Looking at monthly swings since the low-rate era ended in 2022, that ranks third — behind the 68-basis-point move in September 2022 and the 57-basis-point move in April 2022. In percentage terms, the 11.4 percent monthly change ranks fourth, after April 2022 (24.6 percent), September 2022 (21.6 percent) and September 2023 (12.2 percent). It was a big move — but given that yields are already at their highest since 2002, it does not rise to the level of panic. In his August Wall Street Journal op-ed, Druckenmiller wrote: "Markets aggregate information that no committee possesses, and that information is transmitted to policymakers through prices." The price he called "the most important in the world" was the US long-term Treasury yield. On the surge in long-term rates since July that prompted Bessent to intervene, Druckenmiller said volatility had been "contained" and trading "orderly" — diagnosing the move not as a market malfunction but as the mechanism working exactly as it should. In 1992, Bessent and Druckenmiller worked together at Soros Fund Management, betting against the British pound and making a fortune as Britain ultimately surrendered its effort to defend sterling against the market. In 2012–2013, they read the tide of Abenomics correctly, making large bets on a weaker yen and a rising Japanese stock market — and winning again. One time they stood against a government; the other time they stood with one. The direction differed, but both victories came from reading the interplay of policy and market forces with precision. In 2026, Bessent has switched from attacker to defender. He wields the formidable power of the Treasury secretary, but this time he finds himself on the opposite side of the market — and struggling. The irony is hard to miss. If Druckenmiller were sizing up the situation today, he might say: "The market has spoken. Listen." [Explainer] What are 'convexity' and 'negative convexity' in bonds? Convexity: Bond yields and prices move in opposite directions. Normally, when rates fall, prices rise by more than you might expect — and when rates rise, prices fall by less. This asymmetry, which works in investors' favor, is called convexity: a cushioning effect that curves upward. Negative convexity: The reverse situation — where rising rates cause bond prices to collapse while falling rates produce only modest price gains — is called negative convexity, and it is deeply unfavorable to investors. Mortgage-backed securities are the textbook example. Convexity risk: When rates rise, the expected maturity (duration) of an MBS can lengthen suddenly, magnifying the drop in its price. As institutions sell Treasuries to hedge that risk, they push rates higher still — setting off a vicious cycle.
Oct. 3, 2026
-
We are different. And we are alike. [Herald Square]
Nothing in this world is exactly the same as anything else. Even twins differ from each other, and no two products off the same machine are truly identical. It is precisely because things are different that we find them curious and interesting. To be different is to be special. When we treat difference as something strange, we discriminate. Yet when we look closely, we find that while everything differs, everything also resembles something else. It is not only twins who look alike — all people resemble one another, and people resemble nature. Tracing those resemblances is itself a rewarding journey. We are all one, and at the same time, we are many. I was reminded of this while studying word origins. When I first heard that the Korean words "dareuда" (to be different) and "dalmda" (to resemble) share the same etymological root, I was skeptical. Surely different is different, and alike is alike, I thought. But the more I reflected on it, the more I came to see that while nothing in the world is perfectly identical, nothing is completely different either. That is a profound insight — a vision of the world that language itself reveals. Religiously and philosophically, we are people who differ and yet resemble one another. The Korean word "biseuthada" (to be similar) tells a similar story. Something similar is not, strictly speaking, the same. The very concept of a "similar word" implies that two things are not entirely identical. Yet we often mistake similar words for the same word. Most vocabulary etymologically related to "biseuthada" carries a sense of imprecision or being off-target. The clearest examples are "bitnagada" (to go astray) and "bitmatchda" (to hit at an angle) — both convey a direction that is not quite right. Words like "bitgeum" (a diagonal slash), "bital" (a slope), "biteulda" (to twist), "biteulgeorida" (to stagger) and "bittureojida" (to go crooked) all suggest something slanted or unsteady. In hanja-based vocabulary, what we call a "similar word" is technically a synonym in the sense of near-equivalence, not exact equivalence — yet we often treat the two as identical. We take what is merely similar and call it the same. What about the word "gatda" (to be the same)? It is something of an irony that such a word exists in a world where nothing is truly identical. I puzzled over it for a long time, because the expression "gachi" carries two distinct meanings: resemblance and togetherness. "Kkotgachi" means "like a flower," while "gachi sarayo" means "let's live together." You might call it the riddle of "gachi." On reflection, though, I found that "gatda" is etymologically rooted in the idea of closeness — "gakkapda" (to be near). Because something feels close, we come to think of it as the same. That is likely why "gachi" appears in figurative expressions such as "baramgachi" (like the wind) or "hanulgachi" (like the sky) — they convey a felt sense of nearness. And "gachi gapsida" (let's go together) probably began as an invitation to stand close and walk side by side. Meanwhile, the Korean words for "I" and "you" — "na" and "neo" — are worth a closer look. They are the prime example of the Korean saying that "a" and "eo" sound different and mean different things. Neither is right or wrong; they are simply distinct. That is an important insight. You and I are different beings — but we are not completely different. We resemble each other. All people do. In Korean, a person who is neither "na" (I) nor "neo" (you) is called "nu" — a third person who is also different, yet also alike. The idea that we differ and yet resemble one another is a genuinely good way to see the world. Nothing is perfectly the same, but nothing is entirely foreign either. That is why we must live together. To hate one another, to discriminate, to exclude others as wrong — none of that reflects the image of humanity that the Korean language reveals. The words "dareuда" (different), "biseuthada" (similar) and "gatda" (the same) together paint a picture of people who resemble one another living side by side. The word "hamkke" (together) captures that vision of becoming one. It contains the root "han," meaning one. Its opposite, in a sense, is "hannat" — the state of being reduced to isolated, scattered individuals. When we drift apart, each of us becomes a mere "hannat," a lone fragment. I dream of a life in which we all move forward together. We are all, in the end, close to one another. By Cho Hyun-yong, professor at Kyung Hee University
Oct. 2, 2026
-
Naver Clip test
Test. Test. Test. Test. KF-21 officially adopted — a milestone 25 years in the making. We sat down with a Korea Aerospace Industries exports expert to hear the full story and what comes next.
Sept. 29, 2026
- 1Malaysia's BE International brings 1,500-strong incentive tour to Korea, bypassing Turkey
- 2AI singer tops Melon chart for first time with 'Did You Become the Adult You Dreamed Of?'
- 3Jensen Huang's daughter took the photo of him embracing his alleged mistress
- 4Man beat live-in girlfriend 514 times over 3 hours, killing her; forensic expert says footage was too disturbing to watch
- 5Crosswalk at Cheonggyecheon 6-ga intersection opens after 20 years of resident demands
- 6'A concert is a ritual for the soul': Currentzis makes long-awaited Korea debut after six years
-
WORLD
US warns of punishment for anyone enabling Iran's Strait of Hormuz toll scheme
-
INDUSTRY
Toyota union puts productivity first; Hyundai Motor union demands bigger share of profits
-
FINANCE
National Growth Fund to invest $531M in FuriosaAI, which rebuffed Meta's $800M takeover bid
-
INDUSTRY
Korea Shipowners' Association holds amateur baduk tournament for Maritime Day
